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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation introduces a real-time topology monitoring scheme for power sys-
tems intended to provide enhanced situational awareness during major system disturb-
ances. The topology monitoring scheme requires accurate real-time topology information 
to be effective.  This scheme is supported by advances in transmission line outage detec-
tion based on data-mining phasor measurement unit (PMU) measurements.  
A network flow analysis scheme is proposed to track changes in user defined min-
imal cut sets within the system. This work introduces a new algorithm used to update a 
previous network flow solution after the loss of a single system branch. The proposed 
new algorithm provides a significantly decreased solution time that is desired in a real-
time environment. This method of topology monitoring can provide system operators 
with visual indications of potential problems in the system caused by changes in topolo-
gy.  
This work also presents a method of determining all singleton cut sets within a giv-
en network topology called the one line remaining (OLR) algorithm. During operation, if 
a singleton cut set exists, then the system cannot withstand the loss of any one line and 
still remain connected. The OLR algorithm activates after the loss of a transmission line 
and determines if any singleton cut sets were created. These cut sets are found using 
properties of power transfer distribution factors and minimal cut sets.  
The topology analysis algorithms proposed in this work are supported by line out-
age detection using PMU measurements aimed at providing accurate real-time topology 
information. This process uses a decision tree (DT) based data-mining approach to char-
acterize a lost tie line in simulation. The trained DT is then used to analyze PMU meas-
 ii 
urements to detect line outages. The trained decision tree was applied to real PMU meas-
urements to detect the loss of a 500 kV line and had no misclassifications.  
The work presented has the objective of enhancing situational awareness during 
significant system disturbances in real time. This dissertation presents all parts of the 
proposed topology monitoring scheme and justifies and validates the methodology using 
a real system event.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction to the Research Focus 
Under normal operation, different areas of the power system are interconnected 
together and operated synchronously to provide enhanced reliability.  However, under 
rare circumstances, an area of the system can become unintentionally separated from the 
rest of the grid, forming an electrical island.  If the isolated portion of the system has a 
large imbalance between load and generation, the area can experience large fluctuations 
in system frequency and bus voltages. This can lead to some loss of load due to automatic 
protection actions or even a complete blackout of the area. These system events within 
modern power systems are rare occurrences. However, when these events occur, they of-
ten involve the loss of many components over a significant amount of time, which leads 
to a rapid and complete loss of load. For example, the 1977 Consolidated Edison Compa-
ny blackout consisted of 11 transmission lines or transformers outages over the course of 
52 minutes [1]. These line outages represented the loss of critical interties that connected 
the Consolidated Edison Company (Con Edison) to neighboring systems. One of the 
causes of the failure was credited to “Failure to recognize that a critical interconnection to 
the West (Y84) was effectively unavailable” [1]. Knowing the availability of an intertie 
can be difficult. An intertie is not necessarily a single transmission line whose status can 
be monitored. Rather, an intertie can be a portion of the network. This work proposes the 
application of topology based analyses during real-time power system operation, assisted 
by advances in synchrophasor measurement line outage verification, to provide better 
network visualization and awareness. 
 
 
2 
Two different topology based analysis methods are proposed in this work, which 
utilize graph theory and numerical methods. A graph theory based method is introduced 
using maximum flow network flow algorithms to determine cut sets to different locations 
within the system. In graph theory, a network flow can determine the maximum flow 
from a source to a sink within a directed graph [2]. Each branch in the network has a spe-
cific capacity. Normally the capacity of each branch in the network is associated with 
some quantity, such as amount of information in an information network or current in an 
electric power network. However, the method proposed in this work uses network flow 
algorithms where each branch in the network has a capacity of exactly one unit of flow. 
This will result in a network flow solution where the maximum flow is equal to the min-
imum number of branches needed to be lost in order to guarantee disconnecting the 
source from the sink [2]. As outages occur within the system, the value of maximum flow 
is a strong indicator to system operators as to the availability of an intertie. The value of 
using the proposed method is illustrated by discussing several major system events in-
cluding a detailed example of the 2008 island formation that occurred in the Entergy 
power system. This island formation was caused by hurricane Gustav after 14 transmis-
sions lines were lost over the course of 8 hours [3]. The method was applied to a recrea-
tion of the 2008 event using a 20,000 bus model of the Entergy system. 
The proposed network flow method utilizes well-known graph theory network 
flow algorithms [4, 5], but also introduces a new algorithm for updating an old network 
flow solution. This new algorithm takes advantage of the fact that the topology of a pow-
er system changes very slowly, often times changing by only the status of a single line. 
When only a single line is removed from the system, a new network flow solution is not 
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needed. Instead, the old solution can be modified for the slight changes in system topolo-
gy for a solution time reduction that is specific to this application.  
The network flow analysis method provides important information about the to-
pology of the system following transmission line outages. This information is intended to 
inform operators when the system topology changes and help visualize and understand 
the effects of the change. However, the only time corrective actions are required based 
solely on the network flow solutions are when a group of buses could be disconnected 
from the grid by the loss of only a single line. To assist with this situation, the second to-
pology based analysis method proposed in this work utilizes numerical methods and is 
called the one line remaining (OLR) algorithm. The OLR algorithm is focused on identi-
fying potential island formation situations based on the criteria that a number of buses are 
now connected to the rest of the system by only a single branch. These important branch-
es are referred to as critical lines or critical branches in this work. The OLR algorithm 
utilizes a special DC power flow model of the system to obtain information about any 
and all critical lines within the system. The OLR algorithm was also applied to the Enter-
gy Gustav island event to illustrate the information that would be available to system op-
erators if such a system had been in place. 
Both topology based analysis methods presented here rely on the availability of 
accurate system topology information in order to be effective. Telemetry data from the 
supervisory control and data acquisition system (SCADA) cannot always be relied upon. 
To aid with this issue, this work presents advances in line outage verification by using 
phasor measurement unit (PMU) measurements. Line outage verification is achieved by 
detecting when a transmission line has been lost by the constant monitoring of PMU 
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measurements within the system. Once a transmission line outage is detected, the interval 
of measurements just following the outage is examined and compared to simulated out-
ages within a DC power flow model of the system. The comparison between PMU meas-
urements and simulation is used to match the observed outage to a specific line within the 
system. This process was proposed in [6]. The study done in [6] uses an edge detection 
method to detect when a line is lost within the system. The edge detection method used in 
[6] used a small threshold to determine when an event had begun within the PMU meas-
urements. This approach may not work in all cases. For example, the PMU measurements 
recorded during the Entergy island event in 2008 contained much larger variations in the 
data. Therefore, a more robust method of line out detection is presented in this work. The 
accurate detection of line outages is achieved by data-mining PMU measurements using 
the program CART (classification and regression trees). The program CART is designed 
to use a database of past measurements to train a decision tree (DT) that can be used to 
classify future inputs. In this work, line outages are conducted in simulation to create a 
sufficient CART database. The database is then used by CART to train a DT. Finally, the 
DT can be used with PMU measurements to detect line outages within the system. To-
gether, these power system topology analysis methods, supported by advances in PMU 
based line outage verification, amount to an improvement in visualization and system 
awareness for operators during topology based system disturbances. 
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1.2 Phasor Measurement Units 
 Since their introduction in the 1980s, synchronized phasor measurement units 
have become a mature technology with many differently applications being developed 
around the world [7].  A PMU is a device that is located at a substation. The PMU takes 
instantaneous measurements at a particular bus in the system and returns an approximate 
phasor quantity.  PMU measurements have magnitude accuracy that is better than 0.1% 
[8].  Each PMU is equipped with a Global Positioning System (GPS) receiver, which re-
ceives a signal from the GPS system containing the year, day, hour, minute, and second 
[9].  The signal from the GPS system is received once every second. The PMU then in-
ternally divides down this signal to allow sampling rates of 12, 30, 48, or 60 samples per 
second.  The PMUs used in this work take 30 samples every second.  The PMU uses the 
GPS time signal to accurately time stamp each measurement before it is sent off to a 
phasor data concentrator or the control center.  Each PMU measurement is time stamped 
with precision better than 1 microsecond [8].  Once all the measurements are received by 
the control center, the measurements from different PMUs are matched together via time 
stamps to allow a clear picture of the system at a specific time regardless of the distance 
separating the measurement locations. This ability allows PMU measurements to have a 
major advantage over traditional SCADA monitoring.   
1.3 Entergy System and Gustav Event Test Case 
Throughout this work, the Gustav event is used as a test case to validate as well as 
display the benefits of the proposed approach within an actual power system disturbance. 
The Entergy power system serves 2.8 million customers in Arkansas, Louisiana, Missis-
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sippi, and Texas. The system consists of over 1,500 substations with over 15,500 miles of 
lines at voltages of 69 kilovolts (kV) and above. The system has a total generating capaci-
ty of around 30,000 megawatts (MW) with 10,000 MW coming from nuclear sources. 
The system is part of the Eastern Interconnection in North America [10]. When this study 
was conducted, the system included 19 PMUs that are located at important buses 
throughout the system [11]. The Entergy system has 5 major operating areas: WOTAB, 
Amite South, Central, Sheridan North, and Dell. The locations of the different areas with 
the Entergy system can be seen in Fig. 1.1. 
 
Fig. 1.1 The Entergy System and the Five Major Operating Areas [13] 
On September 1, 2008 at 9:30 AM hurricane Gustav made landfall close to New 
Orleans. Over the course of several hours the Entergy system lost 13 tie lines that inter-
connected the Baton Rouge and New Orleans area to the rest of the grid. At 2:49 PM the 
14th and final tie line was tripped that resulted in the formation of an electrical island con-
taining most of Baton Rouge and New Orleans within the Amite South operating area. 
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The time instant of each tie line outage can be seen in Table 1.1. The outages shown in 
Table 1.1 were not the only components lost during the hurricane. Hurricane Gustav 
caused an outage of 241 transmission lines, 354 substations, and left 4,349 transformers 
damaged or destroyed [12]. During this destructive storm, system operators were not 
aware of the threat of islanding. Following the final tie line trip, system operators were 
first altered to the island formation by diverging frequencies measured at different PMU 
locations. The island was only identified 20 minutes after the island formed [12]. 
The island formed was composed of 139 buses. The island contained 3 generators 
and 2 PMUs. The three generating units within the island were all fossil fuel units pro-
ducing 349 MW. The three generators had a combined maximum output of over 1500 
MW. All of the nuclear generators in the system had been turned off in preparation for 
the storm. The total load in the island was approximately 249 MW. At the time just be-
fore the island formed the area was exporting approximately 100 MW. Following the is-
land formation, the 3 generators within the area were able to regulate the frequency. The 
area continued to operate independently from the grid despite no operator actions being 
taken in preparation of the island formation. 
1.4 Network Flow Algorithms 
 One of the network analysis methods proposed in this work utilizes graph theory 
network flow algorithms. In graph theory, a graph is composed of vertices and edges. 
Vertices act as nodes within the graph while edges connect vertices together [2]. If a 
power system is described as a set of buses connected together by transmission lines, then 
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buses in the system would become vertices and the transmission lines would become 
edges. 
Table 1.1 Time Instant of Tie Line Outages During Hurricane Gustav 
Tie Line Lost Time of Outage 
1st 8:52 AM 
2nd 9:21 AM 
3rd 10:19 AM 
4th 11:40 AM 
5th 11:59 AM 
6th 12:15 PM 
7th 12:28 PM 
8th 12:45 PM 
9th 1:14 PM 
10th 1:16 PM 
11th 1:22 PM 
12th 1:28 PM 
13th 2:08 PM 
  
A network flow algorithm can determine the maximum flow that can be delivered 
from a source to a sink within a directed graph where each edge has a specific flow ca-
pacity. A flow represents some physical quantity being transported such as information in 
an information network or current in an electrical network. A directed graph is a graph 
composed of directed edges. Directed edges can only allow flow in one direction. The 
capacity of the edge in the opposite direction is zero [2]. One of the earliest network flow 
algorithms was created by Edmonds and Karp in 1969 [4]. Consider the directed graph 
depicted in Fig. 1.2. There is a fraction associated with each edge in the graph. The nu-
merator indicates the present amount of flow crossing the edge while the denominator 
represents the maximum possible flow allowed. The Edmonds and Karp algorithm can be 
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used to find the maximum flow from vertex 1 to vertex 6 in this graph. A network flow 
solution must satisfy specific criteria in order to be correct [5]. 
1. For every edge, the flow across an edge cannot exceed the capacity of that edge. 
2. For every vertex other than the source and the sink, the sum of the flows entering 
a vertex must equal the flow exiting that vertex. 
3. The flow from source to sink must be maximal. The flow is maximal, if and only 
if, the graph contains no more augmenting paths between the source and the sink. 
 The Edmonds and Karp algorithm finds a solution by finding augmenting paths 
between the source and the sink. A path is a set of vertices and edges in a series where no 
vertex or edge is repeated. An augmenting path is a path where each edge along the path 
has remaining capacity. These paths are found using the breadth first-search (BFS) path 
finding algorithm [14]. Once such a path is found, flow is added to each edge along the 
path and the process starts again. When no more augmenting paths are found the algo-
rithm terminates and a solution has been reached. The Edmonds and Karp algorithm re-
quires three iterations to find a solution for the graph in Fig. 1.2. The results after each 
iteration of the algorithm can be seen in Figs. 1.3-1.5. Notice that the graph in Fig. 1.5 
satisfies all of the solution criteria discussed previously and finds the network has a max-
imum flow of 6. 
The Edmonds and Karp algorithm executes in O(E2V) time, where E is the num-
ber of edges in the graph and V is the number of vertices in the graph. More sophisticated 
algorithms have achieved reduced orders of complexity, such as Dinic’s algorithm 
O(EV2), Karzanov’s algorithm O(V3), and Goldberg and Tarjan O(EV log(V2/E)) [4]. The 
application proposed in this work can utilize any of these algorithms. 
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Fig. 1.2 A Six Vertex Directed Graph 
 
Fig. 1.3 The Edge Flows After the First Iteration of Edmonds and Karp 
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Fig. 1.4 The Edge Flows After the Second Iteration of Edmonds and Karp 
 
Fig. 1.5 The Maximum Flow After the Third Iteration of Edmonds and Karp 
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A power system is not directed in nature because power can flow in either direc-
tion across a transmission line. Representing each transmission line as two directed edges 
with equal capacity and opposite directions could solve this problem.  Consider the di-
rected representation of a bidirectional graph shown in Fig. 1.6. The Edmonds and Karp 
algorithm can also be applied to such a representation. To prevent unnecessary complica-
tion when using this representation, anytime flow is added to an edge, the algorithm 
checks the value of flow along the edge in the opposite direction. If flow is also on the 
opposing edge, then this flow is first reduced before new flow is added to the graph. This 
process is handled “behind the scenes” within the algorithm program. The remainder of 
this work will only discuss bidirectional graphs for simplicity. 
 
Fig. 1.6 The Directed Representation of a Bidirectional Graph 
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1.5 The DC Power Flow Model 
 The second topology analysis method proposed in this work utilizes the DC pow-
er flow model. The power flow problem consists of determining the steady state operat-
ing conditions of a known transmission network that is composed of transmission lines 
and transformers. The scheduled generation and the loads within the system are known 
and the power flow solution consists of obtaining the voltage magnitude and phase angle 
at each node of the system. The equations that represent the power flow at each bus in an 
alternating current (AC) system are nonlinear and given below in (1.1) and (1.2) [15], 
 
Pi = Ei Ek Gik cos θi −θk( )+Bik sin θi −θk( )"# $%
k=1
n
∑  
(1.1) 
 
Qi = Ei Ek Gik sin θi −θk( )+Bik cos θi −θk( )"# $%
k=1
n
∑
,
 
(1.2) 
where, 
            P is real power 
           Q is reactive power 
           E is the bus voltage magnitude at node i or k 
           Gik + jBik = Yik is the ikth term in the Y system matrix. 
           The Y matrix, or bus admittance matrix, is a matrix of admittances that represent a 
transmission network. An example admittance matrix can be seen in Table 1.2.  
Table 1.2 Example Admittance Matrix 
Y1g + Y12 -Y12 0 0 
-Y12 Y2g + Y12 + Y23 -Y23 0 
0 -Y23 Y3g + Y34 + Y23 -Y34 
0 0 -Y34 Y4g + Y34 
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           A connection of R +jX from bus 1 to bus 2 is equal to 1/(R +jX) = G12 + jB12 = 
Y12. Also, the subscript g represents a connection to ground or the reference bus [15]. 
   The nonlinearity of the power flow equations requires that they be solved using a 
nonlinear method, such as the Newton-Raphson method. Nonlinear solvers are iterative 
processes. One method of obtaining solutions faster is by making approximations in the 
equations such that they become linear and can be solved directly. This process results in 
the DC power flow model. In the DC power flow, the equation for reactive power flow 
(1.2) is completely ignored. In (1.1), it is assumed that the voltage magnitudes in the sys-
tem are exactly 1 pu at all times. Also, the resistance in the transmission network is ne-
glected which results in all terms with G to disappear. Finally, it is assumed that the angle 
difference across any line or transformer in the system will be very small. This allows 
sin(θi −θk )  to be expressed as θi −θk( )  in radians. The power flow on each line in the 
system using this method is shown in (1.3), 
 Pik =
1
xik
θi −θk( )
.
 
(1.3) 
This equation written in matrix form is given by, 
 P =Yθ  (1.4) 
where P is a vector of power injections, Y is the admittance matrix, and θ is a vector of 
bus voltage phase angles [15]. Equation (1.4) is solved in two steps. The admittance ma-
trix is factored into LU components, where L is a lower left triangular matrix and U is an 
upper right triangular matrix where LU = Y. Forward and backward substitution is em-
ployed to solve for bus angles for a given set of power injections. For a dense system, LU 
decomposition takes O(n3) operations to complete and forward and backward substitution 
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takes O(n2) operations [16]. For a sparse system, the number of computations needed for 
LU decomposition is, 
n+ ri
i=1
n−1
∑ + ri2 + ri( )∑ / 2     ,                                          (1.5) 
where n is the number of buses in the system and ri  is the number of nonzero elements to 
the right of the diagonal in row i of the U matrix. For a sparse system, the number of 
computations needed for forward and backward substitution is shown in (1.6) which is 
O(n) for a typical power system topology [17], 
2n+ 2 ri
i=1
n−1
∑   .                                                   (1.6) 
Every time a solution is desired, forward and backward substitution is required. However, 
factorizing the admittance matrix only needs to be done when the system topology 
changes. If the system network is altered by the status change of one line, four elements 
in the admittance matrix need to be modified. For example, if line bus 1 to bus 2 no long-
er exists in Table 1.2, elements Y(1,1), Y(1,2), Y(2,1), and Y(2,2) must be modified. The 
DC power flow allows rapid approximate solutions of real power flow in the system [15]. 
The DC power flow is utilized in this work to quickly analyze a power system topology. 
1.6 CART Algorithm and Database 
The program CART (classification and regression trees) produced by Salford Sys-
tems is a data-mining tool that can be used to analyze problems that contain a large num-
ber of variables. CART uses a procedure called binary recursive partitioning to build a 
decision tree (DT). Starting at the root node, simple questions called critical spl
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rules (CSR) are asked regarding one of the input parameters.  The parameter selected for 
the critical splitting rule is called a critical attribute (CA). Each answer to the critical 
splitting rule question creates two branching nodes. Each branching node will have its 
own CSR regarding one of the input parameters. When any of the stopping criteria are 
met at a node, the node will not branch off. Nodes that do not branch off to other nodes 
are called terminal nodes that end the growth of the tree. Once all terminal nodes are 
reached the DT is complete and can be used to categorize new inputs. Given a matched 
set of input and output data, CART will determine its inherent input-output relationship 
in the form of a DT. This process is called DT training. Once training is complete, new 
input data can be dropped down the DT to generate the previously unknown output. Us-
ing this method, the historical PMU measurements and simulation results will serve as 
the necessary information needed to train the DT [18]. 
 In order for CART to run an analysis it must first have a database. The database is 
usually composed of a learning dataset and a test dataset. The learning dataset is used to 
train the DT and the test dataset is used to test the DT. An example CART database can 
be seen in Table 1.3.  A CART dataset contains a single class along with several features. 
The features act as input variables and the class is the categorical outcome. The CART 
database can have a maximum of 32768 features. Adding an additional feature to the ex-
ample CART database would increase the database by 1 column. Additional rows may be 
added to the database to increase the amount of data samples included in the analysis.  
Each CART feature can be either continuous or categorical. 
 CART builds a DT by considering all possible univariate CSRs and selecting the 
CSR that makes the child nodes the purest. A node is considered pure if all the cases that 
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map to that node have the same class. CART then examines all the CSRs for the child 
nodes and continues making addition splits until a stopping criterion is met. CART uses 
the Gini criterion to determine the CSR at each node. The Gini impurity is a measure of 
the partition purity of the data. The Gini impurity at a node t is defined, 
 i t( ) = C(i | j)p(i | t)p( j | t)i, j∑ , 
(1.6)  
where C(i | j) is the cost of misclassifying a class j case as a class i case and p(j | t) is the 
probability of a case being class j given that it falls into node t. The Gini splitting criteri-
on is the decrease of impurity defined in (1.7) for a node t and a split s, 
 Δi s, t( ) = i t( )− pli tL( )− pRi tR( ) , (1.7)  
where pL  and pR  are the probabilities of sending a case to the left child node tL  and to 
the right child node tR  of node t respectively. The value of pL  can be computed as 
 
pL =
p tL( )
p t( ) ,
 
(1.8)  
where p(t) is the probability of a case existing in node t. CART will consider all possible 
splits and compute their corresponding purity improvement Δi(s,t). The CSR with the 
largest improvement will be chosen as the CSR for node t. The process of growing the 
tree will continue until a stopping criterion is met. When a stopping criterion is met at a 
node the node will not branch off. Examples of stopping criteria include: when a node 
becomes pure, when all cases in a node have identical feature values, the DT has reached 
the maximum tree depth specified by the user, the size of a node is less than the minimum 
node size set by the user, or the best split s for node t has a purity improvement Δi(s,t) 
smaller than the minimum specified improvement [19]. 
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Consider the example database in Table 1.3.  This example database holds a very 
simple input-output relationship that can be observed by examining the data.  If input 1 is 
larger then 6.7 then the output is 1 regardless of the value of input 2.  However, if input 1 
is smaller then 6.8, then the output is dependent on the sign of input 2.  A CART DT us-
ing the example CART database can be seen in Fig. 1.7. 
The CART DT in Fig. 1.7 also shows a very simple input-output relationship. 
Here, if input 1 is larger then 6.75 then the output is 1 regardless of the value of input 2.  
However, if input 1 is smaller then 6.75, then the output is dependent on the sign of input 
2. The example CART database shown in Table 1.3. The corresponding CART DT 
shown in Fig. 1.7 is an example of how CART can be used to generate a prediction mod-
el.  In a real application the CART database could have many rows and the relationship 
within the data could be very complicated to determine.  The DT that is generated by 
CART will always match the training data very well.  In order to correctly judge the pre-
diction accuracy a DT, some of the available samples must be withheld from the learning 
dataset to create a test dataset.   
1.7 Literature Review 
1.7.1 Network Flows 
 One of the primary contributions of this work is the proposed algorithm 
used to determine minimal cut sets within a power system to monitor system topology. 
The first network flow algorithm, developed by Ford and Fulkerson, finds a solution us-
ing augmenting paths [20]. The Edmonds and Karp algorithm extended this concept by 
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Table 1.3  Example CART Database 
Output Input 1 Input 2 
1 1 0.01 
0 1 %0.01 
0 1 %0.3 
1 1 0.4 
1 1 0.3 
1 1 0.2 
0 1.5 %1 
1 2 2 
1 2.5 1.5 
0 3 %0.73 
0 3.5 %0.4 
0 4 %3 
1 4.5 0.6 
1 5 0.8 
1 5.5 4 
0 6 %2.2 
0 6.6 %2.3 
0 6.7 0.2 
1 6.8 %0.4 
1 6.9 0.869 
1 7 %0.3 
1 7.1 %0.33 
1 7.2 0.01 
1 7.3 %0.99 
1 7.4 %9.97 
1 7.5 18 
1 7.6 %3 
1 7.7 0.12 
1 8 %1 
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Fig. 1.7  Example CART Decision Tree 
  
 INPUT_2 <=   0.00
Terminal
Node 1
Class = 0
Class Cases %
0 8 100.0
1 0 0.0
W = 8.00
N = 8
 INPUT_2 >    0.00
Terminal
Node 2
Class = 1
Class Cases %
0 1 10.0
1 9 90.0
W = 10.00
N = 10
 INPUT_1 <=   6.75
Node 2
Class = 0
INPUT_2 <=   0.00
Class Cases %
0 9 50.0
1 9 50.0
W = 18.00
N = 18
 INPUT_1 >    6.75
Terminal
Node 3
Class = 1
Class Cases %
0 0 0.0
1 11 100.0
W = 11.00
N = 11
Node 1
Class = 1
INPUT_1 <=   6.75
Class Cases %
0 9 31.0
1 20 69.0
W = 29.00
N = 29
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only using the shortest possible augmenting path each iteration to achieve a run time of 
O(E2V) [4]. Dinic proposed the used of search trees to find all the shortest paths of a spe-
cific length in one iteration [21]. Algorithms like the Karzanov algorithm are ideal for 
dense graphs while algorithms like the Goldberg and Tarjan algorithm are ideal for sparse 
graphs [4]. Network flows are utilized in image processing [22].  Reference [22] proposes 
a network flow algorithm similar to [21] which uses search trees to find paths of a short-
est length. However, [22] proposes reusing the search trees in the next iteration. This al-
gorithm has a worst-case complexity that is worse than similar algorithms but was found 
to have superior run time in practical applications [22]. This dissertation proposes a new 
algorithm for finding the maximum flow in a graph in the case were a graph topology has 
changed by the status of only a single edge and a new solution is desired. This work pro-
poses a way of obtaining the new solution using the old network flow information to pro-
vide a significant computational advantage.  
 This work proposes the use of network flows to find minimal cut sets within a 
power system to provide enhanced situational awareness during major system disturb-
ances. Other work that utilizes cut sets deal with cut set enumeration to determine com-
munication system reliability. In [23, 24], minimal cut sets within a network are deter-
mined to define the reliability of a communication between two points in the network. 
Also, minimal cut sets have been used to identify the reliability of distribution systems 
[25]. A graph-algebraic approach has been proposed that uses a spectrum plot of the sys-
tem Laplacian matrix to analyze system topology [26].  An eye-inspection metric is then 
applied to the spectrum plot to help interpret the results. This spectrum plot method is 
computationally intensive and may not be well suited for large system applications. This 
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dissertation presents an efficient method to monitor the topology of a power system, us-
ing graph minimal cut sets, which produces results with a very clear and concrete signifi-
cance.  
1.7.2 Critical Line Identification 
Another major objective of this work is to determine critical lines within a given 
topology. In this work, a critical line is defined as a line that will disconnect two areas of 
the system if it were taken offline. In graph theory this is referred to as bridge detection 
[2].  A bridge in a graph is an edge that will disconnect two sets of vertices if removed 
from the graph. There are two different types of approaches, graph theory based and ma-
trix based, that have been proposed that can address this problem [27, 28, 29]. Both [27] 
and [28] propose to be used to find bridges specifically within a power system network. 
One graph theory method involves the removal of cycles from a graph [27]. Recall that a 
path in a graph is a set of vertices and edges were no vertex or edge is repeated. A cycle 
is a path that begins and ends at the same vertex (creating a loop). In a cycle, there exist 
two paths between every pair of vertices. Therefore, a cycle cannot contain any bridges. 
Reference [27] presents an algorithm that finds and removes cycles from a graph. Once 
the process terminates the only remaining edges are bridges within the original graph. 
Both graph theory methods of [27] and [29] require O(E) operations to complete. Matrix 
methods involve factoring some form of the network adjacency matrix to identify islands 
or bridges. Reference [28] proposes the triangular factorization of the bus-branch inci-
dence matrix of a network to identify bridges. This method also requires O(E) operations 
to complete. This dissertation proposes an alternative method of bridge finding in power 
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systems that utilizes standard operations used to solve a DC power flow study. The pro-
posed method also achieves O(E) complexity which is consistent with other algorithms. 
 Other related work considers minimum cut set determination using generalized 
line outage distribution factors [30]. When given a system topology and a set of lines, this 
method can determine if the set of lines chosen contains a cut set and which lines of the 
set are a part of that cut set.  
Line outage distribution factors (LODF) deal with changes in line flows following 
the loss of a transmission line or transformer using the DC power flow model and are de-
fined as, 
dlk =
Δfl
fk0
  ,                                                        (1.9) 
where dlk  is the line outage distribution factor looking at line l after an outage of line k, 
Δfl  is the change in MW flow on line l, and fk0  is the original flow on line k. If the cur-
rent flow on lines l and k are known, the flow on line l after the loss of line k can be de-
termined by, 
 lf = l
0f + lkd k
0f ,                                                   (1.10) 
where fl0  and fk0  are the initial flows on lines l and k, and fl  is the flow on line l with 
line k removed [15]. A power transfer distribution factor (PTDF) deals with the change in 
flow of a selected line caused by power injected at one point in the system and the same 
power withdrawn from a different point in the system. For a transaction of t MWs be-
tween points i and j, the impact on line l is given by the PTDF Plij where 
 Δfl = Plijt  .                                                     (1.11) 
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For a set of chosen lines in the system a matrix Ha can be formed. Assume the lines se-
lected are l1 to la. Define the impact on line l for a transaction of t MWs between the end-
points of line l as Pl. Then matrix Ha takes the form 
 Ha =
1−Pl1  −Pla
  
−Pla  1−Pla
"
#
$
$
$
%
&
'
'
'
  .                                      (1.12) 
If the matrix Ha is singular then the set of chosen lines contains a cut set [30]. 
One very important observation discussed in [18] has to do with the effect of sin-
gleton cut sets (bridges) on the PTDFs in the network. Consider the line l in a power sys-
tem that connects two subnetworks together (line l is a bridge). Also consider a transac-
tion of t MWs between the terminal buses of line l. Then the line l is a minimal cut set, if 
and only if 
 Plm
l =
1, lm = l
0, lm ≠ l
"
#
$
%$
   .                                          (1.13) 
This can be extended further. Consider two subnetworks N- and N+ that are connected by 
line l. For any transaction from point i to point j, where point i is in N- and j is in N+, the 
PTDF for this transaction on line l will be 1. The method used to detect critical lines in 
this work takes advantage of this property and is discussed further in Chapter 2. 
1.7.3 PMU Line Outage Detection 
 The other portion of this work deals with transmission line outage determination. 
This problem is addressed in [6, 31-37]. The problem can be broken down into detecting 
when an outage occurs and then matching the outage to a specific line within the system. 
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One of the earliest proposed methods to address this problem is discussed in [6]. A meth-
od commonly used in edge detection is used to detect when an event has occurred. This 
method uses a sliding window over the low-pass filtered phase angle measurements. The 
angle at measurement n is compared with the measurement n-i. The variable i determines 
the width of the window. A value of i = 40 measurements was used in [6]. Once the value 
of n-i exceeds the threshold τ, the method determines that an event has occurred. A value 
of τ = 0.57º was used in [6]. The window continues to move through the data until the 
value of n-i begins to decrease. This signals that the event has ended and matching can 
begin. The maximum value of n-i within the event interval determines the change in qua-
si-steady state voltage phase angle caused by the change in topology. The change in volt-
age phase angles measured by PMUs within the system creases a vector of phase angle 
changes. This vector will have one dimension for every PMU in the system. An approxi-
mate DC power flow model of the system is used to determine the change in voltage 
phase angles that would occur for the loss of any transmission line within the system. The 
vector of angles recorded from PMUs is compared to all vectors found through simula-
tion. Finally, the vector from simulation that matches the vector from PMU measure-
ments the closest is declared the line that was lost. 
 Later works expanded on the issue of matching [31-37]. Reference [31] applies 
the idea proposed in [6] to identify a simultaneous double line outage. This method still 
requires an exhaustive search to identify the lines lost but only requires a small number of 
PMUs to be available. Reference [32] uses a support vector machine approach to match 
outaged lines. Another work extends previous methods to work when observing only a 
particular area of the system and also deals with the cases of islanding caused by the line 
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outage [33]. The work in [34] considers the case of a fully observable internal system 
connected to an external system that contains some PMUs. The method uses measure-
ments from PMUs as well as power flow changes along tie lines in an integer programing 
problem to determine lines lost within the external system. Also, several studies consider 
the case where the system is fully observable by PMUs [35-37]. These methods include 
applying alternating direction method of multiplies [35], a global stochastic optimization 
technique based on cross-entropy optimization [36], and Gaussian Markov random fields 
[37] to match outaged lines using PMU measurements. 
 Of all the work done in this area only [6] discusses the problem of outage detec-
tion. Reference [6] uses real PMU data for testing while the remaining studies only test 
using a simulated system. In a simulated system the problem of detection is not present. 
During a simulated line outage, prior to the line outage, all the system parameters have no 
variation, which makes the beginning of the event obvious. Recall the work in [6] ad-
dresses the problem of detection by using a small threshold (τ) to detect the beginning of 
an event. However, this method could not be adapted to the Gustav event in the Entergy 
power system. The issue arises from the PMU data itself. The work done in [6] shows the 
PMU data during an outage of a 500 kV line carrying approximately 1072 MW in the 
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) system and can be seen in Fig. 1.8. In contrast, the 
PMU data during an outage of a 500 kV line during the Gustav event is shown in Fig. 
1.9. 
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Fig. 1.8 Filtered and Unfiltered PMU Data During a 500 kV Line Outage [6] 
 
Fig. 1.9 Voltage Phase Angle PMU Data Showing a 500 kV Line Outage During the 
Gustav Event 
 It is apparent by comparing the different measurements that the phase angle in the 
Entergy system is far more erratic than the measurements in the TVA system. The study 
in [19] arbitrarily chose a small value of τ and their method works well with their data. 
However, the measurements taken during the Gustav event in the Entergy system are sig-
nificantly different. In order to find an acceptable event detection method using the En-
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tergy data, a different approach is needed. This work proposes the use of a trained DT 
approach to provide a robust method of line outage detection using PMU measurements. 
1.7.4 Applications of Decision Trees 
 Applying the DT data-mining techniques, available through the use of CART, to 
analyze complex problems is not a new idea.  DTs have been applied to many different 
fields of study. One medical study conducted in Taiwan, used CART analysis to predict 
the survival of patients that were diagnosed with liver cancer [38].  A predictive model 
was desired to be able to provide information to patients for understanding treatment out-
comes.  The study used a total of nine features (inputs) in the study.  These variables 
were age, tumor size, tracking period, gender, clinical stage, undergoing surgery, radio-
therapy, chemotherapy, and transcatheter arterial embolization.  The class (output) was 
whether the patient had survived after 5 years.  The study used records of 136 patients 
with liver cancer as training data for the decision tree training.  The study then used the 
records of 91 patients with liver cancer as the database to test the accuracy of the tree.  
The CART model was able to correctly predict the 5-year survival of the 91 patients 74% 
of the time [38].   
 Sometimes the selection of features to use in DT training is not clear. The work 
done in [39] uses a DT and simulated PMU measurements to detect an island formation 
around a distributed generator. The study was interested in the transient signal measured 
by PMUs during island formation. Data from PMUs are a series of measurements over 
time. Simply providing CART with a series of measurements can make it very difficult to 
train a DT with acceptable performance. Instead, intervals within the series are selected 
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around periods of interest. A discrete wavelet transform was used to determine the wave-
let coefficients for each interval. Only these coefficients were then used as features in the 
DT datasets. This study showed a trained DT could identify an island formation around a 
distributed generator with a classification accuracy of 98%. Similarly, the work done in 
[40] uses a DT and simulated PMU measurements to detect high impedance faults. In this 
study, the harmonic content within each interval was extracted using a fast Fourier trans-
form. The harmonic content was used as features in the DT datasets. This study showed a 
trained DT could identify a high impedance fault with no misclassifications for 100 simu-
lated test cases. The work done in this dissertation uses a similar strategy for feature se-
lection. 
1.8 Objectives 
This work is intended to provide an efficient method of monitoring the topology 
of a power system to provide enhanced situation awareness during significant topology 
related system disturbances. The approach will use an efficient and effective topology 
analysis method to identify the minimum number of lines connecting important points in 
the system as well as critical lines (bridges). The method will also use a DT approach to 
identify transmission line outages to allow accurate topology information to be main-
tained in the event of SCADA system telemetry deficiencies. The primary sub-tasks of 
this research, with objectives and a description of the approach adopted for each sub-task, 
are given below: 
1. Present and explain the strategy of applying network flow solutions to a power 
system. The network flow algorithm used to update the minimum cut sets after the 
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loss of a transmission line will be presented. A detailed example of the proposed 
method will be presented with a recreation of the Gustav test case. Also, the value 
of the proposed approach will be examined by discussing two other recent major 
system disturbances. 
2. Present and explain the OLR algorithm used to detect critical lines. The OLR al-
gorithm will then be verified using two test systems. The first system is a small 
system of 16 buses. This small system will allow the reader to easily validate that 
each case run by the OLR algorithm is correct. The next system is a larger 118 
bus IEEE test system. Finally, the Gustav event will be recreated in the Entergy 
system model and the OLR algorithm will be run after each tie line trip to illus-
trate the significance of having the OLR output during a real event. 
3. Create a trained DT for use in line outage detection or SCADA outage verifica-
tion. First, the features to be used in the DT datasets will be selected and ex-
plained. The learning and testing datasets will be created using part simulation da-
ta and part real PMU data. All line outages in the datasets will come from simula-
tions while all the non-event data will come from real PMU measurements. The 
DT will be trained with the learning dataset and then tested using the test dataset. 
4. Test the accuracy of the trained DT using real PMU measurements. The PMUs in 
the Entergy system captured the loss of a 500 kV transmission line that can be 
seen in Fig. 1.9. This trained DT will be applied to this event to show the reliabil-
ity and accuracy of the approach. 
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1.9 Organization of This Report 
 Following the introductory material in the first chapter, this report presents the 
explanation and validation of the topology algorithms in Chapter 2, as well as a discus-
sion of their breadth of application.  Then, details of training and validating the DT used 
to detect line outages are presented in Chapter 3. Next, conclusions are drawn in Chapter 
4. Also, the Matlab code implementation of the network flow algorithms can be seen in 
Appendix A, and the Matlab code implementation of the OLR algorithm can be seen in 
Appendix B.  
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2. TOPOLOGY ANALYSIS 
2.1 Network Flow Analysis 
 This work proposes the use of network flow algorithms to determine the mini-
mum number of lines connecting important locations within a power system. The im-
portant locations used by the algorithm are buses defined by the user. Recall that a net-
work flow algorithm can determine the maximum flow between a source and a sink with-
in a directed graph. If the edges within the graph have capacities of exactly one unit of 
flow, then the maximum flow found within the graph will be equal to the minimum num-
ber of edges that must be removed in order to guarantee disconnecting the source from 
the sink [2]. This work proposes the selection of a single reference that will act as the 
source in all network flow cases. A number of sinks throughout the system are selected 
by the user to create a reasonable number of network flow cases. The solution of each 
case represents the minimum number of transmission lines or transformers that must be 
lost in order to disconnect that specific sink from the reference. A realistic and detailed 
example of this description is presented in Section 2.1.2. This work is included in the fu-
ture publication [41]. 
The locations of sources and sinks within the network must be defined before a 
network flow algorithm can be applied to the system. A large power system may have 
10,000 buses. If a single bus were selected as the source, and every other bus serves one 
time as a sink, this would require 9,999 different cases to be run using the network flow 
algorithm. Not only is this time consuming it is also unnecessary. Instead, only a small 
subset of buses needs to be selected. For example, a single centrally located bus with high 
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degree can be selected as the source. These buses tend to be important to the system in 
some way such as large generators, critical loads, large substations, or PMU sites. The 
sinks in the system can be assigned to other important buses throughout the network. 
Such as setup would guarantee that the network flow solutions would indicate a problem 
if outages in the system begin to isolate any important buses from the source. Using this 
method, it is possible that an island could form that does not include any of the chosen 
sinks, which would be invisible to this approach. However, the intent of this approach is 
to observe major system separations and the absence of a sink within the island implies 
such an event is no a significant threat to the operation of the system.  
2.1.1 Algorithm to Update a Network Flow Solution 
 Consider a single case using the selected source and one sink. The first network 
flow solution to determine the maximum flow must be done using one of the network 
flow algorithms presented previously. Generating a new network flow solution is only 
required when the topology of the system changes in some way. When the topology of a 
power system changes, it is usually due to the outage of a single transmission line. This 
work presents a method of modifying an existing network flow solution after the loss of a 
single branch, to reduce the computational burden of the algorithm and to allow more 
sink locations to be selected. Consider the bidirectional graph in Fig. 2.1.  
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Fig. 2.1 The Maximal Flow in a Network with All Edge Capacities of One 
The Edmonds and Karp algorithm was applied to this network with a source at 
vertex 1 and a sink at vertex 6. It is clear that the minimum cut set connecting vertex 1 
and vertex 6 is of size 2, which is equal to the maximum flow in this graph.  Recall the 
criteria a network flow solution must satisfy in order to be correct (1, 2, and 3). 
1. For every edge, the flow across an edge cannot exceed the capacity of that edge. 
2. For every vertex other than the source and the sink, the sum of the flows entering 
a vertex must equal the flow exiting that vertex. 
3. The flow from source to sink must be maximal. The flow is maximal, if and only 
if, the graph contains no more augmenting paths between the source and the sink. 
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  When an edge is removed from this graph there are three different possible cases 
that could occur. In all cases, a new solution is reached when the capacity and flow on the 
removed edge becomes zero while criteria 1, 2, and 3 are still satisfied. 
• Type Zero – The edge being removed from the graph has zero flow in the current 
network flow solution. This is the trivial case. If the edge being removed from the 
graph has no flow then the capacity of that edge can be set to zero and the new so-
lution is reached. Because no flow was added to the graph, criteria 1, 2, and 3 
must still be satisfied and the solution is correct. An example of a type zero edge 
is edge 1 to 3 in Fig. 2.1. 
• Type One – The edge being removed from the graph has flow in the present net-
work flow solution and is part of a cut set of minimum size. The removal of such 
an edge will reduce the maximum flow in the graph by one. An example of a type 
one edge is the edge 2 to 6 in Fig. 2.1. In the old network flow solution the flow is 
maximal. There are no more augmenting paths between the source and the sink 
and every cut set of minimum size is completely saturated. Also, there will be no 
augmenting paths between the endpoints of the removed edge in the same direc-
tion as the edge flow. For example, all paths from vertex 2 to vertex 6 must cross 
at least one edge that is part of a minimum cut set. However, all minimum cut sets 
are saturated. Therefore, if no augmenting path can be found between vertex 2 
and vertex 6, then the edge belongs to a cut set of minimum size. Then, the solu-
tion can be updated by finding a single valid path that starts at the sink and ends at 
the source that includes the removed edge. A flow of one is added along this path 
and effectively reduces the maximum flow in the network by one. The addition of 
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this flow will also eliminate the flow on the removed edge and the capacity of the 
removed edge can be set to zero. Criteria 1 and 2 remain satisfied because the on-
ly flow added to the system was along a valid path that spanned from the source 
to the sink. The criterion 3 is satisfied when the maximum flow in the graph is re-
duced by one. An updated solution for the removal of edge 2 to 6 can be seen in 
Fig 2.2. The direction and location of the flow added to the system is shown. The 
path used to adjust the solution is found using the BFS path finding algorithm 
[14]. The BFS algorithm runs in O(E) time. The total time to update a solution for 
the loss of a type one edge is also O(E). 
• 3. Type Two – The edge being removed from the graph has flow in the current 
network flow solution but is not part of a cut set of minimum size. An example of 
a type two edge is the edge 1 to 2 in Fig. 2.1. The removal of such an edge must 
not reduce the maximum flow in the system. Because this edge is not part of a 
minimum cut set there must exist a path from 1 to 2 that does not require crossing 
a saturated edge. This path can be used to create a cycle of flow that will elimi-
nate the flow across the removed edge while still maintaining the maximum flow 
within the graph. An updated solution for the removal of edge 1 to 2 can be seen 
in Fig. 2.3. Criterion 1 is satisfied because the added flow does not need to violate 
any edge capacities. Criterion 2 is satisfied because adding flow around a closed 
loop does not violate the conservation of flow. Finally, criterion 3 is satisfied be-
cause the maximum flow in the graph did not change. The path used to adjust the 
solution is found using the BFS path finding algorithm. The total time to update a 
solution for the loss of a type two edge is also O(E). 
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 Fig. 2.2 The Updated Solution for the Loss of the Type One Edge 2 to 6  
Two steps are needed to determine the type of each edge within a network flow 
solution. If there is no flow on the edge it must be type zero. If the edge in question con-
tains flow, the edge type can be determined using a single path search. If an augmenting 
path can be found between the endpoints of the edge in question, in the same direction as 
the edge flow, then the edge must be type two. If no augmenting path can be found, the 
edge must be type one. Once the edge type is determined the new solution can be updated 
after a single path search. This algorithm requires O(E) operations to update a solution  
which is computational less expensive than creating a new solution using any known al-
gorithm. 
Once the reference and sink locations are selected, the initial network flow solu-
tion for each reference-sink pair is found using Edmonds and Karp. Following a trans-
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mission line outage during system operation, the solution for each reference-sink pair is 
updated for the lost edge using the previous network flow solutions. The new values of 
minimum cut sets can then be displayed over a visual representation of the system to pro-
vide the operator, at a glance, the approximate area that was stressed by the most recent 
line outage. The values of minimum cut set provide an approximate indication as to the 
severity of the stress when compared to their value during normal system operation. The 
sinks that have reduced minimum cut sets following an outage provide an approximate 
affected area. As states previously, only one sink needs to be in an affected area to indi-
cate system stress. If one sink lies within an affected area, a more specific group of buses 
can be found by finding the disjoin bus sets associated with that specific reference-sink 
cut set. For example, consider the network in Fig. 1.5. The source is at node 1 and the 
sink is at node 6. The cut set separating the source and sink in this example are lines 1 to 
2, 3 to 5, and 4 to 5. This cut set partitions the system into two disjoint node sets (1, 3, 4 
and 2, 5, 6). This information can more accurately indicate the size of the area being 
pulled away from the grid. A cut set and corresponding disjoin sets can be found using a 
BFS of the network flow solution. Such an algorithm is described in [2, pg. 70] and runs 
in O(E) time. 
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Fig. 2.3 The Updated Solution for the Loss of the Type Two Edge 1 to 2 
2.1.2 Network Flows Applied to the Gustav Test Case 
 A network flow solution can provide important information to system operators 
during significant system disturbances. In 2008, hurricane Gustav made landfall off the 
coast of Louisiana. Over the course of several hours a large electrical island was formed 
around Baton Rouge and New Orleans following the loss of 14 transmission lines [12]. 
Network flows were applied to this system during a recreation of the island event to illus-
trate the information that would have been available to system operators following the 
loss of each transmission line. This recreation was conducted using a 20,000-bus opera-
tions planning model of the system. The network flow algorithms were implemented in 
Matlab. The Matlab implementation of the network flow algorithms can be seen in Ap-
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pendix A. The source used in this study was located at the PMU site at El Dorado. El Do-
rado is a PMU site that is centrally located within the system. Ten sinks were used in this 
study. The sinks include Sterlington, Rodemacher, Coughlin, Scott, Cecelia, Fancy Point, 
Bogalusa, Willow Glen, Waterford, and Ninemile. The locations of Willow Glen, Water-
ford, and Ninemile lie within the islanding area. The results of the network flow algo-
rithms following the loss of each transmission line can be seen in Table 2.1. The first col-
umn in Table 2.1 indicates the most recent line outage (in the same sequence as in Table 
1.1) while the remaining columns indicate the minimum cut sets between any sink (node 
name given in the table) and the reference following that outage. It can be observed that 
the system outages only have effect on a limited number of locations. Also, after the 13th 
line outage the size of the minimum cut set between the reference bus and the three sinks 
within the island, Waterford, Willow Glen and Ninemile, reduces to 1, indicating that on-
ly one remaining path exists and the loss of this path will cause an island to form.  In the 
subsequent row in Table 2.1, which shows the results for the loss of the 14th line, one 
observes that the size of the minimum cut set between the reference bus and the sinks 
Waterford, Willow Glen and Ninemile reduces to zero, confirming that an island has 
formed. 
The size of the minimum cut sets within the system before the event began can be 
seen in Fig. 2.4. The minimum cut sets at 1:30 PM (after the 12th outage) and at 2:10 PM 
(after the 13th line outage) during the event can be seen in Fig. 2.5 and Fig 2.6 respective-
ly. The numbers next to each node indicate the minimum cut set to that node as the sink. 
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Table 2.1 Network Flow Solutions Following the Loss of Each Transmission Line During 
the Gustav Event 
Line Lost                                                  Size of Minimum Cut Set with Node Shown as Sink 
  
Sterlington 
 
Rodemacher 
 
Coughlin 
 
Scott 
 
Cecelia 
Fancy 
Point 
 
Bogalusa 
Willow 
Glen 
 
Waterford 
 
Ninemile 
Before 
Outages 
 
3 
 
4 
 
3 
 
6 
 
3 
 
3 
 
3 
 
6 
 
6 
 
4 
1st 3 4 3 6 3 3 3 6 5 3 
2nd 3 4 3 6 3 3 3 5 5 3 
3rd 3 4 3 5 3 3 3 5 4 3 
4th 3 4 3 5 3 3 3 4 4 3 
5th 3 4 3 5 3 3 3 4 3 2 
6th 3 4 3 5 3 3 3 4 3 2 
7th 3 4 3 5 3 3 3 4 3 2 
8th 3 4 3 5 3 3 3 4 2 2 
9th 3 4 3 5 3 3 3 4 2 2 
10th 3 4 3 5 3 3 3 3 2 2 
11th 3 4 3 5 3 3 3 2 2 1 
12th 3 4 3 4 3 3 3 2 2 1 
13th 3 4 3 4 3 3 3 1 1 1 
14th 3 4 3 4 3 3 3 0 0 0 
 
The figures 2.4, 2.5, and 2.6 also show the approximate geographical locations of 
the selected nodes within the system. A comparison between Fig. 2.4 and 2.5 shows that 
after the 12th line outage the minimum cut sets to nodes within the island area have sig-
nificantly reduced. This implies the cumulative effect of the outages in the system have 
been to stress the intertie between the southeast area and the rest of the system. In Fig. 2.6 
the system has reached a critical state where only one line outage is needed in order to 
form and island around 3 of the selected sink locations. At 2:49 PM the 14th outage oc-
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curs and the island forms. During the real event, system operators were unaware of the 
risk of island formation and did not determine an island existed in the system until 20 
minutes after island formation [12]. However, the network flow solutions provide a 
strong indication of the effect that each outage has on the topology of the system. 
The network flows were run on a desktop computer using a 2.93 GHz Intel Core 
i7 quad core processor. The program determines the initial network flow solution using 
the Edmonds and Karp algorithm. A single network flow solved using Edmonds and 
Karp requires approximately 0.6 s using the 20,000-bus system. Following the loss of 
each transmission line, each old solution is updated using the proposed method described 
previously. Updating a solution for the removal of a type one or type two edge requires 
approximately 0.06 s. Updating a solution for the removal of a type zero edge requires 
only approximately 0.002 s. Also, because power systems are extremely sparse, the num-
ber of edges that contain flow within a given case is very small. For example, in the En-
tergy system, only about 4% of edges contain flow in each case. Therefore, using the 
proposed approach provides a significant advantage in this application. This shows that 
network flow algorithms can be applied to very large power systems and still respond 
quickly following changes in system topology. 
2.1.3 Advantages of Using Network Flow Monitoring 
Network flow monitoring provides unique information about the system during a 
variety of situations. Some of the unique benefits of using the application proposed in this 
work are highlighted in this section. 
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Fig. 2.4 The Maximum Flow to Selected Sinks Within the Entergy System Prior to the 
Event. 
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Fig. 2.5 The Maximum Flows to Selected Sinks Within the Entergy System at Approxi-
mately 1:30 PM During Hurricane Gustav 
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Fig. 2.6 The Maximum Flows to Selected Sinks Within the Entergy System at Approxi-
mately 2:10 PM During Hurricane Gustav 
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During normal operations, power systems are monitored with a variety of real-
time tools. For example, in the MISO (Midcontinent Independent Transmission System 
Operator) system, the supervisory control and data acquisition system (SCADA) system 
takes measurements throughout the system, such as breaker status and voltage magni-
tudes, and reports them back to the control room. State estimation is run every 50 seconds 
using the SCADA data. The state estimate solution generates a power flow case that de-
scribes the current operation of the system that is used for real-time contingency analysis. 
There are over 40,366 buses and about 8,300 contingencies in the MISO network model 
[42]. The MISO system runs two different implementations of contingency analysis, 
Quick CA (contingency analysis) and Full CA. Each implementation of CA analyzes a 
list of contingencies by solving the post contingency state using the fast decoupled power 
flow. The full list of contingencies is solved every 4 minutes using 8 processors in paral-
lel. A smaller list of contingencies is run in the Quick CA that runs every 50 seconds 
[42]. 
The proposed graph theory based method in this work can provide assistance to 
system operators under a variety of scenarios were different amounts of information are 
available. During normal operation, the existence of problems in the system is often iden-
tified by contingency analysis. Power flow computations have a computational complexi-
ty of approximately O(n1.2) using linear methods and O(n1.4) using Newton’s method for 
a single contingency, where n is the number of buses in the network [43]. A system with 
a large number of components requires many contingencies to be considered (such as the 
MISO system) which causes CA studies to take several minutes. In contrast, updating a 
single reference-sink case for the loss of a type one or type two edge takes O(n) opera-
 
 
47 
tions (E is approximately equal to n in large power systems). Recall that power systems 
are very sparse and most edges in a given solution contain no flow (less than 4%). There-
fore, the computations needed to update all cases following a line outage is approximate-
ly 0.04sn, where s is the number of sinks in the system and s << n. This allows the meth-
od to provide immediate indication of system degradation to operators following an out-
age. This information can be used in conjunction with live SCADA measurements to take 
immediate actions, to influence which contingencies are handled first in the next iteration 
of the real-time contingency analysis system, or help visualize the results of a CA study. 
There are times during operation when state estimation, and therefore real-time 
contingency analysis, is unavailable either from convergence failures or software prob-
lems. For example, on August 14th, 2003, a major widespread blackout occurred effecting 
parts of the Northeast and Midwest United States and the Canadian province of Ontario 
[44]. Transmission line outages began at approximately 3:05 PM. By 3:46 PM, the sys-
tem had lost a total of five 345 kV lines and fifteen 138 kV lines representing the loss of 
several important Ohio interties. At this point, analysis of the event indicated that the 
blackout still could have been avoided if around 2 GW of load was dropped in the Cleve-
land-Akron area. At 4:05 PM, another 345 kV line was lost that lead to the blackout 
about 5 minutes later. One of the major causes of this event was a software bug that af-
fected the FirstEnergy Corporation (FE) control room in Ohio. The software bug effec-
tively disabled the alarm system that was integrated into all system monitoring tools. “FE 
operators relied heavily on the alarm processor for situational awareness, since they did 
not have any other large-scale visualization tools such as a dynamic map board. The op-
erators would have been only partially handicapped without the alarm processor, had they 
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known it had failed [44].” Also, just prior to the event, incorrect telemetry data disabled 
the state estimator operated by MISO. An operator corrected the problem but forgot to 
restart the monitoring tool to run every 5 minutes. As a result of these issues, system op-
erators were unaware of major system problems during the event [44]. Although the 
alarm processing system failed, real-time information and measurements for the FE sys-
tem were still being collected and available. The network flow analysis method presented 
in this work is only reliant on system topology information to remain operational. During 
similar situations, a minimum cut set visualization method could still function and en-
hance situational awareness in the absence of state estimation or provide indications of 
malfunctioning systems. 
Lastly, it is common for neighboring systems to not be monitored with state esti-
mation or contingency analysis. As a result, serious issues along the boundary between 
multiple systems can arise because no single operator is aware of all component failures. 
For example, on September 8th, 2011, a blackout affected parts of Arizona and Southern 
California in the southwest United States, as well as Baja California, Mexico [45]. This 
event was initiated by the loss of a single 500 kV line that transported power from Arizo-
na, through the Imperial Irrigation District (IID), into the San Diego area. The outage oc-
curred at approximately 3:27 PM. In less than a minute after the outage, two transformers 
in the IID system overloaded and tripped offline. Following these outages, over the 
course of about 10 minutes, 5 transformers and 4 transmission lines are lost which dis-
connect the San Diego area from the rest of the grid. Later investigations found “Affected 
transmission operators have limited real-time visibility outside their systems, typically 
monitoring only one external bus. As a result, they lack adequate situational awareness of 
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external contingencies that could impact their systems” [45]. For example, after the 500 
kV line outage, the California Independent Transmission System Operator (CAISO) had 
partial visibility into IID’s system, but could not see that two transformers had overload-
ed and tripped. Likewise, IID operators did not learn of the 500 kV line outage in real-
time. During the event, different system operators observed large changes in flows into 
their systems, but were unable to understand the cause or significance of the changes 
[45]. One distinct advantage that the application of network flows has over traditional 
monitoring systems is the ability to easily use a large system model. Increasing the area 
analyzed by state estimation or contingency analysis is a large undertaking. The increase 
in area requires many more component parameters and models to be maintained as well 
as greatly affecting the solution time. However, network flows can be applied to a very 
large system, as shown in the previous section, while still providing results quickly, and 
can provide operators with basic topology information about areas not being monitored 
by any other means. 
2.2 One Line Remaining Algorithm 
 The network flow analysis outlined in the previous section, tracks changes in min-
imal cut sets between user-defined system locations. The changes in a minimal cut set 
over time can be a strong indicator of a problem with the system. However, the only time 
it is certain the system cannot survive any line outages without a problem, is if a minimal 
cut set is found to be of size 1. To address this situation, this thesis proposes an alterna-
tive method, using only standard power systems matrix operations, of detecting when 
critical lines in the system are created. This algorithm is called the one line remaining 
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(OLR) algorithm. In this work, a critical line is defined as a line that will disconnect two 
areas of the system if it were taken offline. The OLR algorithm can identify critical lines 
in a power system following a transmission line or transformer outage, while also deter-
mining the area that would island following the loss of any critical line in the system. The 
OLR takes advantage of the properties of singleton cut sets discussed in Chapter 1. An 
example power system is shown in Fig. 2.6. 
In Fig. 2.6, if line h is taken out of service, This is because all the power 
flowing from point i must pass through line l in order to reach point j. Point i can be 
placed at any point in area 1 and  will not change. Therefore, if it is known what two 
areas a critical line link together, PTDFs can be used to determine which line is the criti-
cal line. Consider that new critical lines can only appear in the system when the topology 
changes. 
 
Fig. 2.6 Example Power System with Two Tie Lines 
For a line outage, if new critical lines have appeared in the system then the end-
points of the outaged line must be in different areas. Consider the system in Fig. 2.6. Line 
l only becomes a critical line following the loss of line h. Also notice that the endpoints 
Plij =1.
Plij
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of line h exist in different areas that would be disconnected if line l was lost. The OLR 
algorithm uses this knowledge to find the new critical lines in the system following each 
line outage. 
For each line outage, the OLR uses a DC power flow study to compute the system 
line flows for power injections at the endpoints of the outaged line. If any lines in the sys-
tem carry all of the power injected, those lines are identified as critical. For each critical 
line, the buses that are in the area of the system that is now vulnerable to islanding can be 
determined by using the voltage phase angles from the DC power flow study. 
2.2.1 Algorithm Explanation 
 The OLR must be initialized before it is applied. Initialization is done by defining 
the system structure in the form of the system admittance matrix. When constructing the 
system admittance matrix all generators, loads, and shunt elements are ignored since the  
purpose of this algorithm is to examine the topology of the network. All branches in the 
network are represented with a reactance of 1 pu. By doing this, the admittance matrix 
represents a uniform weighted graph of the system topology. Consider the 4 bus system 
shown in Fig 2.7. The initialization of the 4 bus system in Fig. 2.7 can be seen in Fig. 2.8. 
 
Fig. 2.7 Simple 4 Bus Power Network 
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−! !!!3 −1−1 !!!2 −1 −1−1 !!!0−1 −1−1 !!!0 !!!2 !!!0!!!0 !!!1  
Fig. 2.8 Admittance Matrix of the Network Shown in Fig 2.7 
This step only needs to be done the first time the OLR algorithm is initiated. 
When a branch in the system is lost the OLR algorithm is invoked. The admittance matrix 
must then be updated to reflect the lost branch. Assume the 4 bus system suffers the loss 
of the branch from bus 1 to bus 2. The diagonals on rows 1 and 2 would need to be re-
duced by 1 while the off diagonals (1,2) and (2,1) would be set to zero. The updated ad-
mittance matrix can be seen in Fig. 2.9. 
 
−! !!!2 !!!0!!!0 !!!1 −1 −1−1 !!!0−1 −1−1 !!!0 !!!2 !!!0!!!0 !!!1  
Fig. 2.9 Admittance Matrix of the Network Shown in Fig. 2.7 After Suffering the Loss of 
Branch 1 to 2 
The OLR algorithm needs to identify areas with the potential to island based on 
the criteria that a bus or (number of buses) is (are) now connected to the rest of the sys-
tem by only a single branch as a direct result of the initial outage. For example, for an 
initial outage of the line from bus 1 to bus 2 in Fig. 2.7, the algorithm must identify any 
lines that are required to allow buses 1 and 2 to remain connected together. For the ex-
ample of the 4 bus system, these lines are 2 to 3 and 3 to 1.  
As discussed previously, the outage of line 1 to 2 can only create new critical 
branches between buses 1 and 2. Therefore, power injections of +1 pu at bus 1 and -1pu 
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at bus 2 are added. All other buses have no power injection. These power injections will 
establish a gradient in the voltage phase angles throughout the system. The highest angle 
in the system will be at bus 1 and the lowest at bus 2. The phase angles at the buses that 
span buses 1 and 2 will lie between the two extremes. Critical branches in the system can 
be identified by using this phase angle gradient. Recall that the power flowing across a 
line in the DC power flow is represented as shown in (1.3). With these power injections 
in the system, if a particular line is required to allow buses 1 and 2 to remain connected 
together, the power flowing across that line must be 1 pu. Recall that when the OLR was 
initialized, the impedance of each line was set to 0+j1 pu. Therefore, the voltage angle 
difference across any system branch that is required to allow buses 1 and 2 to remain 
connected together must be equal to ±1 radian. Solving the DC power flow for this 4 bus 
system yields the voltage phase angles shown in Table 2.2. 
Table 2.2 DC Power Flow Solution of the 4 Bus System Example 
Bus 1 2 3 4 
Voltage Angle 0 rad -2 rad -1 rad 0 rad 
 
Notice that the magnitude of the voltage angle difference across the line from bus 
2 to bus 3 and the line from bus 3 to bus 1 is 1 radian. This signifies that the lines from 
bus 2 to bus 3 and bus 3 to bus 1 are both required to allow buses 1 and 2 to remain con-
nected together. Notice also that the magnitude of the voltage angle difference across line 
1 to 4 is 0 radian. This signifies that this line is not of interest.  
Once the critical branches in the system are found, the algorithm evaluates the 
number of buses that would be isolated for the loss of each critical branch. This is im-
portant to know because an island formation of a single bus may not be of interest to the 
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system operator. However, if the loss of a single branch would cause the isolation of a 
significant portion of the system, the operator would need to be alerted. The algorithm 
determines this information using the voltage phase angle solution of the DC power flow 
study. It was mentioned previously that there is a gradient in the voltage phase angles 
throughout the system. For each critical branch the algorithm examines the voltage angles 
at each end of the line and compares them to the rest of the angles throughout the system. 
For this example, for the critical line from bus 2 to bus 3 these angles are -2 radians and -
1 radian. The algorithm will select the more positive angle. In this case the algorithm will 
select -1 radian. The algorithm will compare the angle at this bus to the angles at every 
other bus in the system. All buses that have an angle of -1 radian or higher will remain 
interconnected following the loss of line from bus 2 to bus 3. For the loss of the branch 
from bus 2 to bus 3, buses 1, 3, and 4 would remain interconnected. The OLR algorithm 
can then easily determine the number of buses that would be disconnected following the 
loss of a particular critical line. Exactly which buses would remain within the island can 
also be recorded during this process. 
A summary of the steps used in the OLR algorithm are given as follows: 
1. The first time the OLR is invoked the system admittance matrix is created. All 
generators, loads, and shunts are neglected and the impedance of each system 
branch is set to 0+j1 pu. 
2. Following the loss of the system branch from bus A to bus B the system ad-
mittance matrix is updated to reflect the loss. 
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3. A DC power flow is formulated and solved with a power injection of +1 pu at 
bus A and a power injection of -1 pu at bus B. All other buses have no power 
injection. 
4. The magnitude of the voltage phase angle change across each branch in the 
system is evaluated. If the magnitude of the voltage phase angle change across 
any branch in the system is equal to 1 radian then that branch is designated as 
a critical branch. 
5. For each critical branch the algorithm selects the more positive angle on either 
end of the line. The algorithm compares this angle with the angle at all other 
buses. Any bus with an angle equal to or larger than this angle will remain to-
gether after that critical line is lost. If the number of these buses is X, the al-
gorithm also computes N-X. The lower of these two numbers is reported as the 
island area. 
The OLR algorithm requires factoring the system admittance matrix each time the 
topology changes and the algorithm is run. Once this is done the DC power flow can be 
solved and a solution can be obtained. However, the most computationally expensive part 
of the OLR algorithm is the factoring of the admittance matrix (O(n) to O(n3)). Therefore, 
the OLR can reduce the time needed to report a solution by using post factoring. Again 
consider the situation in Fig 2.6. Line h is taken offline and the new critical branches in 
the system must be found. When the OLR is run, instead of removing line h from the sys-
tem for the DC power flow it is kept online. This will result in some flow on line h. As-
sume the flow on line h is 0.8 pu. If the loss of line h creates a singleton cut set in the sys-
tem, then the cut set in the system with line h online must be of size 2. The sum of the 
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flows across the cut set must be equal to the power injections. Therefore, if the flow on 
any line in the system is 0.2 pu, then that line must be part of the cut set including line h. 
This also signifies that this line will become a critical line following the loss of line h. 
The OLR algorithm can apply this information very easily. The target flow that identifies 
a critical line is normally 1 pu. If the flow on line h is x, then the new target flow be-
comes 1-x. Using this knowledge the OLR algorithm does not have to factor the system 
admittance matrix in the first step of the algorithm. Instead the OLR algorithm uses the 
old topology and uses the factored admittance matrix from the previous run of the OLR 
algorithm. Once the OLR algorithm reports a solution to the system operator, the admit-
tance matrix can be factored to prepare for the next time it is called. This allows the algo-
rithm to go strait to forward and backward substitution in the DC power flow and allows 
for a fast solution using O(E) operations. 
2.2.2 OLR Algorithm Validation 
 The OLR algorithm was applied to two different systems for testing purposes. 
The first of these systems was the 16 bus system shown in Fig. 2.10. This system was 
chosen to provide examples of OLR solutions that are simple to verify visually. A num-
ber of OLR solutions for outages within this system are shown in Table 2.3. Each outage 
was applied independently of the other outages. 
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Fig. 2.10 16 Bus Power System Network 
The second system used for verification was the IEEE 118 bus system. A diagram 
of this system can be seen in Fig. 2.11 [46]. This system was used to show the OLR solu-
tions when a system suffers a series of outages that lead to an island formation. This 
would be very similar to what happened during the Gustav event. A series of outages was 
applied to this system such that an island would form in the southeast portion of the sys-
tem. A total of 5 lines were removed in order to form the island. The OLR solution after 
each outage in the series can be seen in Table 2.3. Notice that after the 4th outage in the 
series the OLR identifies that the loss of branch 47 to 69 would cause an island formation 
of 47 buses. Once an outage actually forms an island the OLR can no longer generate a 
solution. 
The OLR algorithm was then applied to the Entergy system to demonstrate the 
benefit of using the algorithm during a recreation of the Gustav event. The load in the 
system during hurricane Gustav was very small. As a result, the island would not form 
before every tie line is lost. If the OLR could detect that only a single tie line remained, 
that would be a very significant advanced warning that that area of the system needs im- 
 
 
58 
Table 2.3 OLR Solutions for Several Outages in the 16 Bus System 
Initial Outage Critical Branches Number of Buses in Identi-
fied Area 
1 to 6 None 0 
6 to 7 1 to 5 
5 to 10 
3 
4 
5 to 10 1 to 5 
6 to 7 
1 
4 
11 to 15 7 to 3 
3 to 8 
8 to 11 
14 to 15 
6 
4 
3 
1 
10 to 14 None 0 
3 to 8 7 to 3 
8 to 11 
11 to 15 
14 to 15 
2 
1 
4 
5 
 
mediate attention. The power flow data for the Entergy system, corresponding to the time 
hurricane Gustav impacted the system, was provided by Entergy. This power flow case 
represented the system with just over 20,000 buses. The current implementation of the 
OLR algorithm does not apply sparsity techniques to reduce the computation requirement 
when solving large systems. Therefore, the network size had to be reduced in order for 
the current version of the OLR to be applied to the Entergy system. 
Table 2.4 OLR Solutions for a Series of Outages in the IEEE 118 Bus System 
Initial Outage Critical Branches Number of Buses in Identi-
fied Area 
65 to 68 None 0 
49 to 69 None 0 
24 to 72 70 to 71 
71 to 72 
3 
1 
70 to 24 23 to 24 
47 to 69 
1 
47 
47 to 69 Island forms Island forms 
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 This reduction could be avoided in practical applications. The island that formed 
during the Gustav event contained around 140 buses. The OLR algorithm was applied to 
a 1122 bus portion of the Entergy system network around the Baton Rouge and New Or-
leans area. A diagram of this section of the Entergy system can be seen in Fig. 2.12. The 
Matlab code implementation of the OLR algorithm can be seen in Appendix B. 
The network of the Entergy system shown in Fig. 2.12 was drawn using PSS/E 
and does not correspond to the geographical representation of the real Entergy system in 
this area. The area that disconnected from the rest of the system is illustrated in Fig. 2.12. 
Recall that 14 tie lines were lost during the hurricane before the island formed. A series 
of 13 outages were applied to the Entergy system to simulate the progress of the Gustav 
event. The OLR algorithm was invoked after the loss of each branch. The solutions for all 
of the tie line outages during the event can be seen in Table 2.5. 
The OLR solutions have several interesting aspects. The outage of the first tie line 
in the series creates two potential islanding areas of 22 and 23 buses. This may have been 
important to know at the time of the event. Also, the loss of almost every branch creates 
small potential island areas (all but the 9th outage). After the 13th tie line was lost the 
OLR algorithm identifies several critical branches that could each potentially create an 
island of significant size. The actual line outage that created the island was bus 53226 to 
bus 53173 230 kV. The algorithm identifies that the loss of this line would create an is-
land containing 139 buses. This shows that the OLR algorithm can correctly identify the 
critical branches in the system. Also, the OLR identifies that there were 5 other critical 
branches at that operating condition that could have led to a large island formation in the 
same area. 
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Fig. 2.12 PSS/E Drawing of the Entergy System in Southeast Louisiana. The PMUs 
Within the Island and the Endpoints of the Final Two Tie Lines are All Labeled. 
 In the identified area at the time the 13th tie line was lost, there were 3 generators 
supplying approximately 346 MW. The load in this area was approximately 246 MW 
with the area exporting 100 MW using the final tie line (the 6 critical branches identified 
are in series). The goal of the OLR algorithm is to prevent loss of service to customers (if 
possible) in the event an island forms. If operators had the OLR algorithm output they 
could have chosen to reduce the flow exiting the island in anticipation of the possible is-
land formation. This would result in higher confidence that the island would remain oper-
ational after island formation. Also, if any of the 6 identified branches were reported to 
have gone offline the operators would know immediately that the island had formed and  
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Table 2.5 OLR Algorithm Solutions for the Gustav Event 
Tie Line Removed Number of Critical Branch-
es 
Number of Buses in Identi-
fied Area 
1st  3 1, 22, 23 
2nd  5 1, 1, 2, 3, 2 
3rd  14 1, 4, 3, 1, 3, 11, 13, 11, 8, 9, 
6, 10, 10, 2 
4th  4 1, 3, 4, 1 
5th  6 6, 4, 3, 2, 1, 2 
6th  1 1 
7th 5 3, 2, 4, 5, 7 
8th  8 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10 
9th  None 0 
10th 1 1 
11th 4 1, 3, 2, 1 
12th 7 6, 7, 5, 1, 1, 2, 3 
13th  53266-53173 
7 others 
139, 173, 172, 19, 147, 148, 
146, 20 
 
required special attention. Recall that in the real event it took 20 minutes to confirm the 
island had formed. 
Together, the network flow and OLR algorithms track changes in the system to-
pology and present results to system operators that have a clear physical significance. 
Significant power system events sometimes require several major component outages be-
fore a rapid system collapse or serious problem occurs [1, 12, 41]. The components that 
lead to these scenarios are serving as interties to different operating areas. The constant 
monitoring of these cut sets provides system operators with a fast approximation of the 
location and severity of potential problems within the power system. 
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3. LINE OUTAGE DETECTION 
3.1 PMU-Based Line Outage Detection 
 The topology monitoring algorithms presented in the pervious chapter require ac-
curate real-time system topology information in order to be effective. The statuses of 
components in a power system are usually reported by the SCADA system. SCADA te-
lemetry is then used by the topology processor to determine the structure of the system in 
real-time [42, 47]. However, during severe system events such as hurricanes, earth-
quakes, or even system malfunction, some or all SCADA measurements may be unavail-
able, leading to an uncertain system topology. Prior to such an event, the topology of the 
system would be known. If changes in line status could be tracked independently of 
SCADA measurements, an accurate system topology could be maintained. This thesis 
presents an advanced method of detecting line outages using PMU measurements to be 
used in conjunction with existing line outage matching techniques [6, 31-37]. The pro-
posed method of line outage detection is accomplished by training a DT to detect the sig-
nature of a line outage in PMU measurements.  
3.1.1 Hurricane Isaac Simulations 
It was discussed in Chapter 1 that a DT method needs sufficient training data in 
order to be effective. A method that requires having historical events to train with would 
not be as useful as a method that only requires simulating new events. For this reason, the 
DT is trained using simulation data. The event in the PMU data available from the Enter-
gy system was withheld from the training data to be used for method validation. To be 
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sure the trained DT can be applied to the real data for validation, line outages were simu-
lated in the same area as the real event. Specifically, 50 Gustav island formations were 
created in simulation to supply the line outages needed for DT training. These simula-
tions were conducted using an operations planning representation of the system. It was 
desired to simulate the line outages using power flow cases with a variety of operating 
conditions. For this purpose, five power flow cases were provided by Entergy, which cor-
responded to hurricane Isaac. Hurricane Isaac made landfall at 7:00 PM on August 28, 
2012 near the mouth of the Mississippi River [48]. The five power flow cases correspond 
to different times during the operating horizon; 10:30 AM August 28th, 12:00 PM August 
28th, 12:00 PM August 29th, 6:00 PM August 29th, and 12:00 PM August 31st. Along with 
using the five different operating conditions, ten different orders were used to create a 
total of 50 simulations. The order of line outages that actually occurred during the Gustav 
event was included as one of the ten orders. The remaining nine orders were random. The 
simulations were conducted using PSS/E v33.3. As stated previously, the same island in 
each simulation was created using one of the five power flow cases and one of the ten tie-
line outage orders, providing a total of 50 simulations. During each simulation, the values 
of bus frequency, voltage magnitude, and voltage phase angle, were recorded at each of 
the PMU sites at Buses 75400, 76821, 52905, and 53120. Buses 75400 and 76821 are 
located outside the island area. Buses 52905 and 53120 are located within the island. In 
each simulation, the 14 tie lines were removed at a rate of one every five seconds until 
the island formed. 
After studying the simulation results, several characteristics were observed. The 
frequency data in each simulation did not seem to show any useful information. Both the 
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voltage magnitude and voltage phase angle showed unique characteristics, and the simu-
lations appeared to create two categories. In the first category, a sudden change in differ-
ence in phase angle of at least 5º was observed during the removal of at least one tie line. 
In some simulations, a sudden change in phase angle could be observed for the loss of 
several lines. A clear example of this can be seen in Fig. 3.1. In the other category, a sud-
den change in voltage magnitude in the islanded area of at least 5% was observed during 
the removal of one tie line. An example of this can be seen in Fig. 3.2. 
 
Fig. 3.1 Simulated Voltage Phase Angle Difference Between Buses 75400 and 52905 
After looking through the simulations it was found that all 50 simulations fell into 
category one while 31 of the 50 simulations fell into category two. After studying the 
simulations, the real PMU voltage magnitude and voltage phase angle data were studied 
at the times when tie lines were removed from the system. In the real event, last two lines 
to go offline before the island formed were bus 55026 to bus 63411 500 kV (penultimate) 
and bus 53266 to bus 53173 230 kV (last). 
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Fig. 3.2 Simulated Voltage Magnitude at Waterford Inside the Island Area 
 The period of interest was the time when the penultimate tie line went offline. The 
PMU data at this point showed a signature in the phase angle measurements, but nothing 
was found in the voltage measurements. A plot of the voltage phase angle difference be-
tween the inside and outside of the island can be seen in Fig. 3.3. 
 
Fig. 3.3 Voltage Phase Angle Difference Between the Inside and Outside of the Island 
Area Measured by PMUs During the Loss of 55026-63411 (500 kV) 
At the moment the 500 kV line was lost, the PMU data observed a ~12º change in 
the difference between phase angles that stands out from the rest of the data. This is con-
sistent with what was seen in the simulated line outages.  
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3.1.2 Feature Selection 
 It was decided to use a feature selection strategy similar to the one used in [39] 
and [40]. Here, intervals were selected around the times of interest. Rather than using the 
time series data as the feature to classify, only specific characteristics within each interval 
are included. Recall that [39] uses a discrete wavelet transform on each interval to deter-
mine the wavelet coefficients to identify an island formation around a distributed genera-
tor. These coefficients are then used as features in the CART datasets. In the other exam-
ple, [40] uses root means square and harmonic content of each interval to detect high im-
pedance faults. For this work the features need to capture a sudden large change followed 
by a smaller oscillation. The features for each interval were then chosen to be: 
• End: The value of the last data point in the interval. 
• Max1: The largest value in the interval. 
• Min1: After the time of Max1, the smallest value in the remaining interval. 
• Max2: After the time of Min1, the largest value in the remaining interval. 
• Min2: After the time of Max2, the smallest value in the remaining interval. 
• Slope 5: The largest slope between any two data points that are 5 data points 
apart in the interval. 
• Slope 10: The largest slope between any two data points that are 10 points apart 
in the interval. 
• Slope 50: The largest slope between any two data points that are 50 points apart 
in the interval. 
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The CART database was built using only voltage phase angle data. The intervals 
selected from the simulation data would begin at the loss of a tie line when a sudden drop 
in phase angle was observed and would extend approximately 1200 measurements. An 
example of an interval used in the CART database can be seen between the dotted lines in 
Fig. 3.1. Before features could be computed the data within the selected interval would 
need to be preconditioned. It is desired that the DT only look at the relative change in 
phase angle within the interval. For example, if the phase angle begins at -30º and in-
creases to -20º, then this should be the same as going from 0º to 10º. This was done so 
that the DT would not need as much training data to define all possible changes in angle. 
Also, the DT needs to treat positive changes in angle the same as negative changes, for 
the same reason. For each interval selected, the first data point was defined to be zero and 
all other data points would be adjusted accordingly. Also, the absolute value of every 
measurement was taken. Once each interval was selected, the features could be comput-
ed. Of the 50 simulations conducted, 80 intervals were selected out of the simulated 
phase angle data to be used in the CART database. These intervals would have a Class of 
1 to indicate a line was lost. The intervals that would have a Class of 0 (or no line lost) 
were drawn from the real PMU data around times were it was known that no line was 
tripped. There were 79 intervals of Class 0 selected from the real PMU data to complete 
the CART database. 
3.1.3 Decision Tree Training and Testing 
 The CART database contains features from 159 intervals. The CART database 
was divided into two parts. Data from 81 intervals would serve as the learning dataset and 
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data from 78 intervals would serve as the test dataset. A DT was trained using the learn-
ing dataset with equal misclassification cost. The resulting DT can be seen in Fig. 3.4. 
 
Fig. 3.4 DT Trained with the Learning Dataset 
The DT produced by CART contains 2 terminal nodes and has no misclassifica-
tions. It states that if the Slope 50 is less than or equal to 5.32 then no line was lost during 
that time interval. Otherwise, a line was lost. The DT has only one splitting rule using the 
feature Slope 50. This indicates that the feature Slope 50 is the only feature necessary to 
determine if a line has tripped. The DT was then tested using the test dataset. The results 
of the test can be seen in Table 3.1. In Table 3.1, the column “Total Class” lists the total 
number of samples in the data that should be classified as the “Actual Class.” The 
possible classes are 1 indicating an outage, and 0 indicating no outage. The column la-
beled “Class 0” indicates how many times the DT classified the inputs from the pool in 
“Total Class” as 0. The column “Percent Correct” for row one is found by dividing col-
umn “Class 0” by column “Total Class.” The test database contains data from 39 
intervals that should be classified as 0, and 39 intervals that should be classified as 1. The 
 SLOPE_50 <=   5.32
Terminal
Node 1
Class = 0
Class Cases %
0 41 100.0
1 0 0.0
W = 41.00
N = 41
 SLOPE_50 >    5.32
Terminal
Node 2
Class = 1
Class Cases %
0 0 0.0
1 40 100.0
W = 40.00
N = 40
Node 1
Class = 1
SLOPE_50 <=   5.32
Class Cases %
0 41 50.6
1 40 49.4
W = 81.00
N = 81
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DT was able to correctly classify every case in the test database, giving the DT 100% 
accuracy in this test.  
Table 3.1 DT Training Results 
Actual Class Total Class Percent Correct Class 0 Class 1 
0 39 100% 39 0 
1 39 100% 39 0 
 
This DT was also applied to the real PMU voltage phase angle data around the 
time that line 55026 to 63411 was reported to have gone offline. The DT applied to 45 
minutes of PMU voltage phase angle data can be seen in Fig. 3.5. The features in this 
figure were caluclated using a sliding interval.  Each time the interval advances, the 
features for that interval would be calculated and dropped down the DT.  
 
Fig. 3.5 DT Applied to PMU Measurements of the Real 500 kV Line Outage 
The DT made several classifications of 1 near minute 8. This is the same time that 
line 55026 to 63411 was known to have gone offline. The DT also classified all other 
samples as 0. These results indicate that this method of line outage detection provides a 
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reliable way of detecting changes in system topology. The DT was trained with only 
simulated line outages but still had great performance when tested using real PMU 
measurements. This method can be used in conjunction with existing line outage 
matching techniques to maintain an acurate system topology in real-time in the event of 
SCADA data telemetry deficiencies. This method can also be used as a way to verify 
SCADA line outage reports. If system topology informaiton can be maintained, the 
topology monitoring methodology proposed in this work can be fully utilized during 
system disturbances. This method of PMU line outage detection using decision trees is 
included in the publication [49].  
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4. CONCLUSIONS 
This dissertation proposes a real-time topology monitoring scheme for power sys-
tems intended to provide enhanced situational awareness during major system disturb-
ances. The topology monitoring scheme requires accurate real-time topology information 
to be effective.  This scheme is supported by advances in transmission line outage detec-
tion based on data-mining PMU measurements.  
A network flow analysis is capable of tracking the change in user defined minimal 
cut sets within a power system, which can alert system operators to significant changes in 
system topology. The network flow approach proposed in this work makes use of well 
known graph theory network flow algorithms, but also introduces a new algorithm for 
updating an old network flow solution for the loss of only a single system branch. The 
network flow approach was applied to the Entergy system in a recreation of the Gustav 
island formation. The algorithm was able to track significant changes in the system to-
pology and visually present clear indication that a portion of the system was being sever-
ally effected by transmission line outages. For cases within the 20,000-bus Entergy sys-
tem, the Matlab implementation of Edmonds and Karp requires approximately 0.6 s to 
generate an initial solution. However, updating a previous solution for the loss of a type 
one or type two edge requires 0.06 s. Updating for the loss of a type zero edge requires 
only 0.002 s. Also, because power systems tend to be extremely sparse, the vast majority 
of branches in a given solution do not contain flow. Therefore, the proposed method of 
updating pervious network flow solutions provides a significant computational advantage 
in this application.  
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 Network flow based topology monitoring provides unique benefits to system op-
erations. The algorithm only requires network topology information in order to generate a 
solution. This approach can supplement conventional system monitoring methods and 
serve as backup monitoring in the event of computer system failures. The proposed 
method is also fast enough to be used with a large system model. This allows system op-
erations to monitor the topology of a large area beyond the network managed by state es-
timation and real-time contingency analysis.  
 This work also presents a method of determining all singleton cut sets within a 
given network topology called the OLR algorithm. The OLR can provide additional in-
formation in the event a minimal cut set is determined to be of size one. The OLR can 
also identify less significant potential island formations that are not visible in the user de-
fined minimal cut sets being monitored. The OLR algorithm activates after the loss of a 
transmission line and determines if any singleton cut sets were created. The algorithm 
also identifies all groups of buses that would remain connected together following the 
loss of a singleton cut set. The OLR algorithm requires only standard matrix operations, 
which are common in power system analysis studies. This allows utilities to easily im-
plement and maintain their own program as opposed to other methods. This method was 
applied to a recreation of the Gustav island event. The algorithm correctly identified the 
last tie line lost before the island of 139 buses was formed as well as 5 other lines that 
could have created an island of similar size and location.  
 The topology analysis algorithms proposed in this work are supported by line out-
age detection using PMU measurements aimed at providing accurate real-time topology 
information. This process uses a DT based data-mining approach to characterize a lost tie 
 
 
74 
line in simulation. A DT was trained using intervals containing simulated line outages 
and intervals of real PMU data that did not contain an event. The DT training determined 
Slope 50 was the best and only feature necessary to detect the outage of transmission 
lines. The threshold for this feature to detect a line outage was found to be Slope 50 > 
5.32. The trained DT was applied to real PMU measurements around the time a 500 kV 
line was known to have gone offline. The DT was able to correctly identify the time of 
the 500 kV line outage with no misclassifications. This method of DT training is an accu-
rate and effective method of detecting line outages in PMU measurements even when 
large variations exist within the data.  
This method of line outage detection provides a reliable way of detecting changes 
in system topology. This method can be used in conjunction with existing line outage 
matching techniques to maintain an acurate system topology in real-time in the event of 
SCADA data telemetry deficiencies. If system topology informaiton can be maintained, 
the topology monitoring methodology proposed in this work can provide insight into 
potential problems in the network even in the absence of state estimation and real-time 
contingency analysis. 
The topology monitoring method proposed in this work is one implementation of 
local vulnerability metrics using minimum cut sets. This work could be extended to inclu-
deed more complex setups. For example, every line within a power system does not need 
to be included in the study when applying the method. By only including specific eleme-
nts, the method could be tuned for a specific system. One possible extension of this work 
is determining the optimal setup when using network flows in a specific system. Also, the 
maximum flows found in this work focus on the special case when all edges have a 
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capacity of one unit of flow. Another possible extension of this work is using maximum 
flows when edges have different capacities such as the maximum power flow across each 
line or the present value of power flowing. Including additional studies using different 
edge capacities in conjunction with the strategy proposed in this work may result in 
improved performance. 
The greatest difficulty faced when using PMU line outage detection in a real 
power system is the fact that power systems today contain very few PMUs compared to 
the number of buses in each system. When only a small number of PMUs exist in a 
power system, not all line outages will be observable at all operating conditions. 
Additional work could be done by developing a method to find all observable line outa-
ges within a power system for the present system operating condition. This would allow 
operators to know which line outages could be tracked using a PMU measurements.  
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APPENDIX A 
MATLAB IMPLEMENTATION OF NETWORK FLOW ALGORITHMS 
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function[]=Network_Flows 
  
%--------------------------------------------------- 
%Network Flow Algorithms 
%Trevor Werho 
%2015 
%Matlab (R2011a) 
  
%Determines the minimum cut set between a source and a sink in 
%a network using Edmonds and Karp 
%After the removal of a branch is specified the solution 
%is updated using the old solution 
%The process of removing and updating can be repeated 
%--------------------------------------------------- 
 
clc 
format short 
%specify the source bus number 
source=1; 
  
%specify the sink bus number 
sink=2; 
  
%constructs the network and generates the initial solution 
[S,Flows,LinesIn,New_num,Vec1,Vec2,N,r_org,c_org]=Points(source,sink); 
S 
  
%specifies the branch that is removed and updates the solution 
%the first two inputs define the removed branch, example: (3,4,S… 
[S,Flows,LinesIn]=lineout(3,4,S,Flows,LinesIn,... 
    New_num,Vec1,Vec2,N,r_org,c_org); 
S 
  
end 
  
function[S,Flows,LinesIn,New_num,Vec1,Vec2,N,r_org,c_org]=Points(r,c) 
  
%constructs the network and generates the initial solution 
  
[New_num,N,T,F,Status,Vec1,Vec2,LinesIn,Flows]=BuildYbus(r,c); 
  
%generates the initial solution using the Edmonds and Karp method 
[S,Flows,LinesIn]=mostflow(r,c,New_num,LinesIn,Flows); 
  
r_org=New_num(r); 
c_org=New_num(c); 
end 
  
function[New_num,N,T,F,Status,Vec1,Vec2,LinesIn,Flows]=BuildYbus(r,c) 
  
%this function reads the system information in from a text file 
%used to initialize the program 
%the file is a list of system branches in the form: 
%from bus  to bus  resistance  reactance susceptance  line-status 
%(1 or 0) 
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[T, F, R, X, B, Status]=textread('file name.txt','%d %d %f %f %f %d'); 
M=length(T); 
  
%the buses are renumber starting at bus 1 
check=zeros(1,505000); 
New_num=zeros(1,505000); 
  
%the source location is specified to be bus 1 
New_num(r)=1; 
check(r)=1; 
  
i=1; 
k=2; 
while i < M+1 
    if check(T(i)) == 0 
        if Status(i)==1 
             
                if T(i) ~= c 
            New_num(T(i))=k; 
            check(T(i))=1; 
            k=k+1; 
                end 
             
        end 
    end 
     
    if check(F(i)) == 0 
        if Status(i)==1 
             
                if F(i) ~= c 
            New_num(F(i))=k; 
            check(F(i))=1; 
            k=k+1; 
                end 
             
        end 
    end 
    i=i+1; 
end 
  
New_num(c)=k; 
check(c)=1; 
 
%the sink location is specified to be the last bus 
N=k; 
Ybus=zeros(N); 
  
Old_num=zeros(1,N); 
i=1; 
while i < 505000+1 
     
    if New_num(i) ~= 0 
    Old_num(New_num(i))=i; 
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    end 
     
    i=i+1; 
end 
  
%build graph sparse matrix 
i=1; 
k=1; 
while i < M+1 
     
    if check(T(i)) == 1 
         
        if check(F(i)) == 1 
             
            if Status(i) == 1 
                 
                  Vec1(2*k-1)=New_num(T(i)); 
                  Vec1(2*k)=New_num(F(i)); 
                  Vec2(2*k-1)=New_num(F(i)); 
                  Vec2(2*k)=New_num(T(i)); 
                  k=k+1; 
                    
             end 
        end 
    end 
    i=i+1; 
end 
  
M=k-1; 
  
LinesIn=sparse(N,N); %keeps track of all lines that are in service 
Flows=sparse(N,N); %keeps track of all lines that contain flow 
  
%records the lines that are in service in a sparse matrix 
M=length(Vec1); 
  
i=1; 
while i < M+1 
     
    LinesIn(Vec1(i),Vec2(i))=1; 
     
    i=i+1; 
end 
  
end 
  
function[S,Flows,LinesIn]=lineout(r,c,S,Flows,LinesIn,New_num,... 
    Vec1,Vec2,N,r_org,c_org) 
  
%this function updates a network flow solution following the loss 
%of a system branch 
  
  
%checks for line flow 
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step=3; 
  
if Flows(New_num(r),New_num(c))==0 
    if Flows(New_num(c),New_num(r))==0 
    LinesIn(New_num(r),New_num(c))=0; 
    LinesIn(New_num(c),New_num(r))=0; 
    step=0; 
    end 
end 
  
if Flows(New_num(r),New_num(c))==1 
    if Flows(New_num(c),New_num(r))==0 
    Flows(New_num(r),New_num(c))=0; 
    LinesIn(New_num(r),New_num(c))=0; 
    LinesIn(New_num(c),New_num(r))=0; 
    step=1; 
    end 
end 
  
if step==3 
if Flows(New_num(r),New_num(c))==0 
    if Flows(New_num(c),New_num(r))==1 
    Flows(New_num(c),New_num(r))=0; 
    LinesIn(New_num(r),New_num(c))=0; 
    LinesIn(New_num(c),New_num(r))=0; 
    step=2; 
    end 
end 
end 
  
%for a flow from r to c 
if step == 1 
     
    %check for augmenting path 
    [D,path]=graphshortestpath(LinesIn,New_num(r),... 
    New_num(c),'Method','BFS','Directed','true'); 
     
    %if a path is found the edge is type 2  
    if D < 999999999 
         
        i=1; 
        while i < D+1 
     
            LinesIn(path(i),path(i+1))=0; 
            Flows(path(i),path(i+1))=1; 
             
             
            if Flows(path(i+1),path(i))==1 
                 Flows(path(i),path(i+1))=0; 
                 Flows(path(i+1),path(i))=0; 
            end 
             
            i=i+1; 
        end 
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    end 
     
    %if no path is found the edge is type 1 
    if D > 999999999 
  
        if r_org ~= New_num(r) 
        [D,path]=graphshortestpath(Flows,r_org,... 
            New_num(r),'Method','BFS','Directed','true'); 
         
        i=1; 
        while i < D+1 
     
            Flows(path(i),path(i+1))=0; 
            LinesIn(path(i),path(i+1))=1; 
     
            i=i+1; 
        end 
         
        end 
         
        if c_org ~= New_num(c) 
        [D,path]=graphshortestpath(Flows,New_num(c),... 
            c_org,'Method','BFS','Directed','true'); 
         
        i=1; 
        while i < D+1 
     
            Flows(path(i),path(i+1))=0; 
            LinesIn(path(i),path(i+1))=1; 
     
            i=i+1; 
        end 
         
        end 
         
        S=S-1; 
         
    end 
end 
  
%for a flow from c to r 
if step == 2 
     
    %if a path is found the edge is type 2  
    [D,path]=graphshortestpath(LinesIn,New_num(c),... 
        New_num(r),'Method','BFS','Directed','true'); 
     
    if D < 999999999 
         
        i=1; 
        while i < D+1 
     
            LinesIn(path(i),path(i+1))=0; 
            Flows(path(i),path(i+1))=1; 
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            if Flows(path(i+1),path(i))==1 
                 Flows(path(i),path(i+1))=0; 
                 Flows(path(i+1),path(i))=0; 
            end 
             
            i=i+1; 
        end 
         
    end 
     
    %if no path is found the edge is type 1 
    if D > 999999999 
  
        if r_org ~= New_num(r) 
        [D,path]=graphshortestpath(Flows,r_org,New_num(c),... 
            'Method','BFS','Directed','true'); 
         
        i=1; 
        while i < D+1 
     
            Flows(path(i),path(i+1))=0; 
            LinesIn(path(i),path(i+1))=1; 
     
            i=i+1; 
        end 
         
        end 
         
        if c_org ~= New_num(c) 
        [D,path]=graphshortestpath(Flows,New_num(r),c_org,... 
            'Method','BFS','Directed','true'); 
         
        i=1; 
        while i < D+1 
     
            Flows(path(i),path(i+1))=0; 
            LinesIn(path(i),path(i+1))=1; 
     
            i=i+1; 
        end 
         
        end 
         
        S=S-1; 
         
    end 
     
end 
  
end 
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function[S,Flows,LinesIn]=mostflow(r,c,New_num,LinesIn,Flows) 
  
%this function determines the initial network flow solution using 
%Edmonds and Karp 
  
count=0; 
flag=0; 
while flag < 1 
  
    [S,path]=graphshortestpath(LinesIn,New_num(r),... 
        New_num(c),'Method','BFS','Directed','true'); 
  
  
if S < 999999999 
    count=count+1; 
i=1; 
while i < S+1 
     
    LinesIn(path(i),path(i+1))=0; 
    Flows(path(i),path(i+1))=1; 
     
    i=i+1; 
end 
else 
    flag=1; 
end 
end 
S=count; 
end 
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APPENDIX B 
MATLAB IMPLEMENATION OF THE OLR ALGORITHM 
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function[]=OLR_Algorithm 
  
%----------------------------------------------------- 
%OLR Algorithm 
%Trevor Werho 
%2014 
%Matlab (R2011a) 
  
%Determines all singleton cut sets in a system following the removal of 
%a specified line   
%----------------------------------------------------- 
     
clc 
  
%command to build the admittance matrix for the system 
%only used once to initialize the program 
%[Ybus,New_num,N,T,F,Status]=BuildYbus(); 
[Ybus,New_num,N,T,F,Status]=BuildYbus(); 
  
%Define the line that has gone offline 
%update the admittance matrix to reflect the loss 
%[Ybus,r,c]=ModYbus(Ybus,bus #, bus #,New_num); 
[Ybus,r,c]=ModYbus(Ybus,1,2,New_num); 
  
%display the first bus number of the outaged line 
r 
  
%display the second bus number of the outaged line 
c 
  
%Solve the DC power flow for injections at both ends of the 
%outages line 
[Ang2]=FindAngles(Ybus,r,c,New_num); 
  
%Find all critical lines as well as the area that corresponds to  
%each line 
[Branches,Area]=FindLines(Ang2,T,F,Status,New_num,N) 
  
end 
  
function[Ybus,New_num,N,T,F,Status]=BuildYbus() 
   
%this function reads the system information in from a text file 
%used to initialize the program 
%the file is a list of system branches in the form: 
%from bus  to bus  resistance  reactance susceptance  line status 
%(1 or 0) 
[T, F, R, X, B, Status]=textread('file name.txt','%d %d %f %f %f %d'); 
M=length(T); 
check=zeros(1,505000); 
New_num=zeros(1,505000); 
  
%the buses are renumbered starting at bus 1 
i=1; 
k=1; 
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while i < M+1 
    if check(T(i)) == 0 
        if Status(i)==1 
            New_num(T(i))=k; 
            check(T(i))=1; 
            k=k+1; 
        end 
    end 
     
    if check(F(i)) == 0 
        if Status(i)==1 
            New_num(F(i))=k; 
            check(F(i))=1; 
            k=k+1; 
        end 
    end 
    i=i+1; 
end 
  
%the program checks for double lines 
%double lines are represented as one connection 
i=1; 
tempnum=0; 
while i < 505001 
     
    tempnum=tempnum+check(i); 
     
    i=i+1; 
end 
N=tempnum; 
Ybus=zeros(N); 
  
%if Same_X=1 then lines resistances and reactances are ignored 
Same_X=1; 
  
%builds the system admittance matrix 
i=1; 
while i < M+1 
     
    if check(T(i)) == 1 
         
        if check(F(i)) == 1 
             
            if Status(i) == 1 
                 
                if Same_X == 0 
  
                
Ybus(New_num(T(i)),New_num(F(i)))=Ybus(New_num(T(i)),... 
                    New_num(F(i)))-1/(R(i)+1i*X(i)); 
                
Ybus(New_num(F(i)),New_num(T(i)))=Ybus(New_num(F(i)),... 
                    New_num(T(i)))-1/(R(i)+1i*X(i)); 
                
Ybus(New_num(T(i)),New_num(T(i)))=Ybus(New_num(T(i)),... 
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                    New_num(T(i)))+1/(R(i)+1i*X(i)); 
                
Ybus(New_num(F(i)),New_num(F(i)))=Ybus(New_num(F(i)),... 
                    New_num(F(i)))+1/(R(i)+1i*X(i)); 
                 
                else 
                     
                
Ybus(New_num(T(i)),New_num(F(i)))=Ybus(New_num(T(i)),... 
                    New_num(F(i)))-1; 
                
Ybus(New_num(F(i)),New_num(T(i)))=Ybus(New_num(F(i)),... 
                    New_num(T(i)))-1; 
                
Ybus(New_num(T(i)),New_num(T(i)))=Ybus(New_num(T(i)),... 
                    New_num(T(i)))+1; 
                
Ybus(New_num(F(i)),New_num(F(i)))=Ybus(New_num(F(i)),... 
                    New_num(F(i)))+1; 
                 
                end 
     
             end 
        end 
    end 
    i=i+1; 
end 
  
end 
  
function[Ybus,r,c]=ModYbus(Ybus,r,c,New_num) 
  
%this function updates the admittance matrix for the loss of a line 
  
Ybus(New_num(r),New_num(r))=Ybus(New_num(r),New_num(r))+... 
    Ybus(New_num(r),New_num(c)); 
Ybus(New_num(c),New_num(c))=Ybus(New_num(c),New_num(c))+... 
    Ybus(New_num(r),New_num(c)); 
Ybus(New_num(r),New_num(c))=0; 
Ybus(New_num(c),New_num(r))=0; 
  
end 
  
function[Ang2]=FindAngles(Ybus,r,c,New_num) 
  
%this function solves the DC power flow 
  
N=length(Ybus); 
I=zeros(N,1); 
Ang=zeros(N,1); 
  
I(New_num(r))=1; 
I(New_num(c))=-1; 
  
Ybus2=Ybus; 
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I2=I; 
Ang2=Ang; 
  
Ybus2(N,:)=[]; 
Ybus2(:,N)=[]; 
I2(N)=[]; 
Ang2(N)=[]; 
  
[Q,R] = qr(Ybus2); 
A=Q'*I2; 
Ang2=R\A; 
Ang2(N)=0; 
end 
  
function[Branches,Area]=FindLines(Ang2,T,F,Status,New_num,N) 
  
%this function finds the critical lines and areas 
  
M=length(T); 
Branches=[0,0]; 
Area=[0]; 
  
%critical lines are found and stored in Branches 
p=1; 
i=1; 
while i < M+1 
     
    if Status(i) == 1 
    Angle=abs(Ang2(New_num(T(i)))-Ang2(New_num(F(i)))); 
    if Angle > .999 
        if Angle < 1.0001 
        Branches(p,1)=New_num(T(i)); 
        Branches(p,2)=New_num(F(i)); 
        p=p+1; 
        end 
    end 
    end 
     
    i=i+1; 
end 
  
%determines the number of buses in each critical area 
%stored in Area 
i=1; 
while i < p 
     
    temp_ang1=Ang2(Branches(i,1)); 
    temp_ang2=Ang2(Branches(i,2)); 
    temp_ang=max(temp_ang1,temp_ang2); 
     
    area_count=0; 
    k=1; 
    while k < N+1 
         
        if Ang2(k) > temp_ang-.1 
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            area_count=area_count+1; 
        end 
         
        k=k+1; 
    end 
     
    temp_area=min(area_count,N-area_count); 
     
    Area(i)=temp_area; 
     
    i=i+1; 
end 
 
 
%buses are returned to their original numbering 
i=1; 
while i < 3 
     
    k=1; 
    while k < p 
         
        j=1; 
        while j < 505001 
             
            if Branches(k,i) == New_num(j) 
                Branches(k,i)=j; 
                j=505001; 
            end 
                 
            j=j+1; 
        end 
         
        k=k+1; 
    end 
     
    i=i+1; 
end 
  
end 
 
